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TERRORISM

FRANCE

'ACTION DIRECTE' STATEMENT ON ANTI-ISRAELI ATTACK

Paris LE MATIN in French 3 Aug 82 p 13

[Article: "Paris: Action Directe Returns"]

[Text] The car of an Israeli official in Paris was shot at on Sunday while parked empty on Quai de la Marne (19th district). Shortly afterward, responsibility was claimed by an anonymous caller who said he was from Action Directe.

The car, which was empty, was parked at the intersection of Quai de la Marne and Rue des Ardennes, along Ourcq Canal. The police found three bullet holes in the car body, a Passat with diplomatic plates. The car belonged to an official who had left a few days earlier on vacation to his country. Israeli Embassy officials were of the opinion yesterday that the official--who, for security reasons, was not identified--was not personally the target, and that the purpose was a warning to Israel.

The Passat was taken to Quai-des-Orfevres, where experts of the Police Headquarters central laboratory will conduct the usual ballistic tests. The investigators have not yet found any witness.

The attack was claimed about 1900 hours in a phone call to AFP by an anonymous caller who said he was speaking on behalf of Action Directe: "This is Action Directe, Marcel-Rayman combat unit," the caller said. "We Jewish fighters of Action Directe have just shot up the car of an Israeli diplomat on Quai de la Marne. A communique will follow." At that time, the police were not yet aware of the attack.

Then, a little after 2000, a further anonymous call stated that a communique had been put in a phone booth on Place de la Bourse. A white, sealed unmarked envelope was found, and in it a photocopy statement of 10 lines or so, full of spelling mistakes: "We Jewish fighters of Action Directe solemnly state our condemnation of the Israeli troops' genocide of Palestinians. Faithful to the determination of Thomas Elekdes, Marcel Rayman, Mendel Langer, the fighters of Botvine Division, and all our brothers who have fought weapon in hand against capital, we will not let the Palestinian people be exterminated in the ghetto of West Beirut. Whether Jewish or Arab revolutionaries, united we will struggle unceasingly against the Saudi princes or the Zionist

warmongers, gendarmes of U.S. imperialism." The statement was signed: "Action Directe, Marcel-Rayman combat unit."

Marcel Rayman was one of the leaders of the famous communist resistance group immortalized by Louis Aragon in his poem "The Red Poster." Rayman, as leader of the group, and the Armenian militant Missak Manouchian were shot by the Nazis on 21 February 1944, as were the two other men cited in the statement. The group was composed exclusively of communists belonging to the immigrant labor (MOI) section of the PCF.

The attack was the fifth anti-Israeli terrorist action in the capital since the beginning of the year.

On 31 March, the purchasing office of the Israeli Defense Ministry in Paris on Boulevard Malesherbes was shot at. On 3 April, the first Israeli diplomat to be killed in France, Yakov Barsimantov, was shot by a woman at his residence in Paris. These two attacks were claimed by the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Elements.

Finally, on 20 July there were two attacks in Paris on institutions related to Israel, Leumi Bank, where pro-Palestinian leaflets were found, and an export-import company.

9920
CSO: 3100/890

BRIEFS

GAS, OIL DEPOSITS CONFIRMED--The oil rig in the northern seas, Katakolo II, which found signs of natural gas around two months ago, has now confirmed deposits of both natural gas and oil. Tests are going on all this week and it is hoped that within a few days an evaluation of the extent of the deposits will be completed. [Text] [Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 3 Aug 82 p 1]

CSO: 4600/713

VERHOFSTADT ON ECONOMIC POLICY, STRUCTURAL REFORMS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 14 Jul 82 pp 16-19

[Interview with Guy Verhofstadt, president of the PVV, by Marc Reynebeau and Hubert van Humbeeck: "'I Did Not Expect any Halleluyahs' -- One Semester of Guy Verhofstadt in Big Politics"]

[Text] When, following the electoral victory of 8 November 1981, the PVV [Party for Freedom and Progress (Flemish)] joined the Martens V administration, a problem arose for the party. Indeed, President Willy De Clercq expressed a preference for becoming minister of finance in the new administration, and thus needed a successor.

The question was whether the party would presently dare to throw the then 28-year-old Guy Verhofstadt from Ghent, president of the PVV Youth, to the lions. Verhofstadt did not just drop out of a clear blue sky. In the preceding years he had, together with his young PVV members, launched quite a number of ideas, which had also penetrated to the party congresses and he had thus substantially contributed to the fresh image with which the PVV approached the voters.

Verhofstadt was elected president in February without too many problems, gathered his young people around him and continued in the direction he had adopted. Since then, 6 months later, it has not always been a bed of roses. Up to now he has primarily put forward two ideas -- the negative income tax relative to the social security reform and the implementation of employment zones, of which more will be said later on -- both of which have been derided, however, in wide circles of the political establishment.

The criticism did not come from the socialist opposition alone. The CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] expressed its opposition /in principle/ [printed in italics] to his social security plans which, for that matter, were not thankfully received within his own liberal health insurance fund either. His plan concerning employment zones was even rejected by the Flemish Economic Association [VEV].

It is clear that Verhofstadt is exceedingly bothered by the fact that he encounters so little willingness to talk about the ideas he puts forward, to start the discussion and to study them. He refers to the attitude of politicians who state that something must indeed change, but who list 20 reasons why it cannot be done after all, as political nihilism. He constantly emphasizes

that he wants to work over time, that it will take 15 or 20 years before all these reforms /can/ [in italics] be realized. That it is a question of the fundamental choice between liberalism and collectivism, and that it has to be made now.

Question: Mister president, the PVV won the elections last year with a campaign in which the citizens, during hard times, were promised a great deal. In this sense, are you happy with what the government has done thus far?

Guy Verhofstadt: We proposed a program last year. In Belgium it is still a fact that whoever wants to be in the government must make a compromise with a coalition partner. Thus far the government has conducted a policy of austerity, supplemented with a few typically liberal actions. I am thinking here of the tax reductions for enterprises, with which we want to stimulate the economy.

What the government has done thus far was /unavoidable/ [in italics]. Over the last 4 to 5 years, a number of basic imbalances have developed which must first be righted. The government has been working on this and has also done something about the competitiveness of enterprises. This has improved over the last few months.

But now it is time to cross over to a second stage in which the structures themselves will also be tackled. Social security and the tax system must also be reformed. I remain convinced that the crisis is the crisis of a system, of the mixed economy, of having applied socialist principles for too long. Any-one who wants to do something about the crisis will have to do something about the mixed economy.

Question: Nevertheless, people did not get more money in their pockets as the PVV had promised last year, did they?

Verhofstadt: The choice was the following. Either you can continue like the previous administrations and meet the deficits with even more taxes. Or you can moderate, in which case the money will remain in the companies, so that productivity will be able to go up and the enterprises will once again have room to think about investments. The difference lies in the fact that the money from the moderation does not go to the government, but to the companies which can then use it to create more jobs. That is the economic problem. As far as the problem of the budgetary deficit is concerned, there is a need to save on the structures. We must dare to question the structures, we must dare to reform.

Question: The people should accept a 3 percent reduction. Meanwhile, it is assumed that it will certainly be more than that, without guarantees that any of it will be returned in the form of investments.

Verhofstadt: The moderation was necessary for all businesses. Including the healthy ones. Maybe now they can plan new investments. Will they take place? I believe in a free market. Businesses must first be productive, and only then can they think about investments and can jobs be created. It has always been that way; there is no other way.

Question: And yet, it has been said that the people should accept a 3 percent cut, and that it will be more. Shouldn't an explanation be given for this?

Verhofstadt: What is important is that the moderation took place. The intention was to bring the labor costs in our country down to the level of the surrounding countries. And that has happened now.

Question: In the meantime, the first balance sheet does not look all that positive, does it? Inflation is approaching 10 percent, the competitiveness of enterprises is improving, but that was already happening, and the balance of trade is showing disturbing figures.

Verhofstadt: I don't agree with that, partly because a balance sheet after 6 months is senseless. On the balance of trade, the growth figure for exports has gone up more than the growth figure for imports. The deficit in the balance of payments will be reduced to 3 percent in 1982, compared to 6.25 percent for last year.

I do agree that right now there are no results yet in the area of investments and employment, even though there are indications that there is some improvement. This year, more than 15 billion francs have already been invested in Belgian corporations, as against barely 300 million francs last year. As far as employment is concerned, the number of productive jobs has been stabilized; no more losses are being recorded. But something like that cannot be done in a few months time; it may be 2 years before you see any effects here. Investments are planned and then carried out; that is a question of 1 or 2 years. But confidence grows; the psychological impact on the economy is more important than is generally accepted.

Furthermore, the results of this government will have to be compared with those of the previous governments. In recent years, we have experienced an explosion of unemployment and real dis-investment. To continue that way doesn't make any sense; let us try something different for a few years.

Question: Don't you think that these new investments will be primarily job destructive, directed toward rationalization?

Verhofstadt: Partly, perhaps. But even these are necessary to a certain extent in order to maintain a number of other jobs, otherwise the whole package would be lost.

This is why we are pleading in the government that, in addition to the moderation policy which will have to be continued next year, special actions also be carried out to attract new businesses. This is why we put forward, among others, the idea of employment zones, with primarily advantages at the tax level. In the late fifties, we managed to get out of the crisis because we managed to attract new businesses with the expansion act. Such an action is once again needed. As a matter of fact, the employment zones are accepted by Ministers Eyskens and Geens. There will shortly be a royal decree.

Question: The criticism of these employment zones was harsh. According to some people, this would lead to Taiwan-like situations for the companies which establish themselves there, while according to others this would distort competition with the companies which are not established there.

Verhofstadt: I am aware of that criticism, yes. We are supposed to want to turn the clock back 100 years, and so forth. Companies establishing themselves in an employment zone would not have to meet the dozens of administrative formalities which have to be met by anyone who wants to start a business in our country. The zone administration would play an intermediary role in these matters between the business and the government. Thus the company would be able to get to work quickly.

These businesses would not have to pay corporate taxes either, while some municipal taxes would also be eliminated. What is actually the intention of this? The intention is that new businesses are attracted, and therefore it is necessary that prospects in terms of cash flow be good for a period of 15 to 20 years. If we eliminate corporate taxes, we can give the economy a strong push. We could stimulate employment in those areas which have been hard hit now.

Furthermore, there cannot be any question of distorted competition as we are talking about investments in new products or new production methods.

Question: There is no intention then of creating a kind of free labor market?

Verhofstadt: That is a discussion which must take place at a general level; employment zones are specific.

Question: A number of areas are now willing to harbor such a zone. Will you be able to find enough enterprises with new production methods to fill all of them?

Verhofstadt: But such employment doesn't cost anything. The expansion laws cost tens of billions of francs per year. Assume that a few of these zones fail; that is not serious because they don't cost anything. Even if only a single business applies, it will be pure gain.

Question: Who will determine whether something is new?

Verhofstadt: The zone administration will do that. This will include people from the enterprises themselves, from the municipality and from the government. There are so many products which are not manufactured here. Think about chips, for example. It is true that we assemble computers, but the chips themselves we have to import. They often involve techniques which are developed in our own universities, but which are applied abroad.

Question: Will your plans concerning social security already be taken into account when next year's budget is drawn up?

Verhofstadt: There are two possibilities. We can allow the system to continue functioning one more year on the basis of tax increases and technical measures. In terms of social security, for example, we know what this leads to; people have been making efforts every year and sometimes these efforts have been painful. But the following year, the deficit was even greater. I am not saying that all the measures which need to be taken now must fit into the large structural reforms I am advocating, but they must form a beginning for a financial balance for the future.

Question: Will any measures be taken yet which fit in with your philosophy?

Verhofstadt: I hope so. Take family allowances. Now people unilaterally receive 500 to 900 francs less. But that doesn't change anything in the system, and so next year there will be an equally large deficit. But we could, for example, include the 13th and 14th months of family allowance in the tax system. We could, for example, replace this 13th and 14th month with a tax credit which would go down as the income goes up. Those who don't have any taxable income would then receive an allowance equal to the original 13th and 14th months. Thus, a certain form of selectivity would be built in, and the whole system would become less expensive.

People always say that our proposals are not social. But we are always interested in protecting the lowest incomes. The higher incomes would get the opportunity to accept their own responsibility in terms of social security, they could take care of their health care themselves.

Question: That is the negative income tax system, or social tax allowance system as you call it now. But have you figured out yet what that system produces? When does someone receive an allowance?

Verhofstadt: Our file on social security reform is clear. In it, we demonstrate, among other things, that a reform is necessary because any other measures do not solve the problem. And the social security system is on the verge of bankruptcy; within the foreseeable future we will no longer be able to pay out pensions or unemployment benefits, or the like. We also demonstrate that the social impact of the current system is not all that great. In turn, we want to spend less money overall for social policy, but in such a way that what we do spend goes to the lowest income groups, and thus has a greater social impact. Right now, all that money is being spread over all the population brackets. We feel that all those who are able to, should accept their own responsibility, so that the whole system may remain solvent. Is there anything more logical, more social?

Question: But at what point does someone receive an allowance?

Verhofstadt: In 1981 figures, a standard household with two children with no income would receive 280,000 francs. If this family has ensured itself socially, so that it does have an income, then it would naturally receive a smaller social-tax allowance. Taxes must be paid beginning with an income of 560,000 francs. If there is only one child, then they would only receive a 240,000 franc allowance and taxes would have to be paid beginning with 480,000 francs income. Those who take care of their own health care and who buy social

insurance, will be able to deduct their payments from their taxes. That is only normal as the government will have to intervene less later on.

Our system integrates both direct and indirect taxes together, there is only one system. All taxes come from income taxation, which finances the system. But the whole social security operation is also reformed into a single system. Those who have more children, for example, will receive a higher allowance or will be able to earn more before having to pay taxes. Everything is included. The only difference is that there is no longer any checking into the reason why a loss of income takes place at a certain time. Whether someone becomes ill or unemployed, it doesn't matter; as soon as there is a loss of income, the system is activated.

Question: The only remaining problem is that your coalition partner is very much against it.

Verhofstadt: I am not saying that we should introduce that system tomorrow. We only want to demonstrate that another system is possible, and would also be just. I have heard Jean-Luc Dehaene say in the Senate that social security is simply accepted. All I am asking is that the system be investigated, that a debate on the subject be initiated. The negative income tax is not a holy cow for us. But it is time to put an end to presenting it as if it were a breaking down of social programs. I think that we would be able to achieve more social results with our system, and, moreover, it would all remain payable.

I simply believe that our system is more humane. We want to create a relationship between an official and a citizen, whereby the official notes that the citizen's income is too low and that consequently an allowance needs to be granted. That is all. The criticism involves primarily a system of interest groups, of people who make a living from it and who want to keep it intact. And then arguments are used which are not relevant to anything.

Question: Both in terms of the negative income tax and the employment zones, the criticism went in the direction of a breakdown of social programs. It was not only the socialists who rejected your plans.

Verhofstadt: That is why I spoke of collectivist criticism.

Question: Is Dehaene a collectivist? And what about the VEV in terms of the employment zones?

Verhofstadt: Collectivists are those who want to keep the current system intact, with all its injustices. The philosophy of that system is that all income brackets must pay more every year in order to maintain the system. In this view, the government has to take care of everything. Those are collectivists.

And as for the criticism of the VEV, few ideas have been put forward here which have not been criticized.

Question: In what way?

Verhofstadt: Those who would benefit from the employment zones are new companies, and they are not yet members of the VEV.

Question: Even within your own party, everyone does not agree. Is the health insurance fund also a bastion for you?

Verhofstadt: This will have to be permanently worked on. I did not expect any alleluias. We are asking the people to make a choice between liberalism and collectivism; this is what it is about.

Question: It looks as if the 1982 budget deficit will be higher than the accepted 252 billion francs, doesn't it?

Verhofstadt: We don't know the exact figure; some people say that it might be 300 billion francs. But you cannot judge this administration on the basis of the previous administration's budget. The 1983 budget will be the first Martens V budget.

Question: What will that budget look like?

Verhofstadt: The government is working on it; I am awaiting the results of the talks. At the fiscal level, we are asking that attention be paid to the marginal assessment rates, which must be brought down. The overall taxation should not go up, but of course it would be possible to rearrange things.

Question: Is there in your opinion any chance of ever getting back to full employment?

Verhofstadt: Yes, but then this society will have to be organized differently. Then the government would have to loose a great deal of its fat.

Question: But the government employs 800,000 people.

Verhofstadt: The private sector must once again become more important than the public sector. At present, hundreds of billions of francs are being used inefficiently by the government. The private sector would be able to put that money to use in a more productive manner. A franc used by the private sector has a greater multiplier effect on employment. But I agree that there would be a transition stage, with an increase in unemployment. The effect on employment would be gradual, while we are working.

Question: But it isn't possible to remain stuck with half a million unemployed individuals, is it?

Verhofstadt: No, but that is precisely what will happen if we don't do something about that mixed economy. A society should be willing to reform in such a way that in the short term there may be 700,000 people unemployed, a number which would then gradually go down. That is a challenge which one either dares to take up or not.

Question: How could all those people then be absorbed?

Verhofstadt: A number of public enterprises would be managed by the private sector. Take the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration]. There are countries where this is managed by the private sector, and where as many if not more people work in that institution. Partly because they offer more services. I expect that a lot of initiatives will take place, at various levels.

Question: And they will be able to absorb all that?

Verhofstadt: They will be able to absorb that to a large extent. Add to this the demographic evolution which will cause supply on the labor market to drop as of 1985. But this would once again produce a situation in which the current welfare state would no longer be able to carry that large number of inactive individuals.

Question: Do you expect the municipal elections to have any consequences for the coalition?

Verhofstadt: If the government succeeds in drawing up a sound budget, then I don't expect any problems. Actually, we always get a few percentage points less in municipal elections. That is so because we are still less well structured at the local level. Hence, a comparison with the figures of 8 November would not be quite honest. But we are not allowing ourselves to be led by an arbitrary public opinion poll at the present time. We know what we want, what debates we want to conduct. We want to work on this for years on end, until it has been achieved.

8463
CSO: 3105/201

FLEMISH ECONOMISTS VIEW IMPACT OF REGIONALISM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 22 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat: "Flemish Economists' Opinion on Belgium: A Return to Centralism or a Separatist Slide?"]

[Text] Where is Belgium heading? Three Flemish economists explained in a series of seven long articles printed by the newspaper DE STANDAARD that there are not a million possible outcomes. We are headed straight towards separatism. And if we still want to maintain Belgian unity, we must quickly define the national economic and monetary rules that will preserve the unity of the Belgian economic market. Otherwise, we will only have to choose between reasonable negotiation for dividing up Belgium or plunging into chaos. And if the result is separatism, the standard of living of all Belgians would decline, but it would be felt harder in Wallonia and especially Brussels, the regions that derive the most benefit from maintaining Belgian unity. According to these three economists, Brussels would be the dupe, and the best thing for it to do would be to align with Flanders. These economists conclude that, from an economic point of view, the inhabitants of Brussels that want regionalization because of their linguistic problems are committing "an historic error."

Dirk Herremans, Jef Vuchelen, and Paul Van Rompu, all university professors, have made a long analysis of economic federalism and its consequences. The Flemish newspaper DE STANDAARD clearly specifies that this is only a study and that it does not take a stand. But stating that the Belgian debate is between a return to a certain amount of economic centralism and a slide towards separatism is probably not without harm at a time when the August 1980 regionalization is being attacked from all sides and an interministerial study group is examining the possibility of regionalizing the five economic sectors that have remained national.

These three economists say that the results of the August 1980 regionalization have been bad; all the conditions have been laid for an evolution towards separatism and not towards federalism. In fact, three essential coordinating factors are missing. In order to avoid separatism, the financial responsibility of the regions and central monetary authority must be reinforced and standard rules must be imposed to ensure economic union, i.e. the unity of the Belgian market. However, they say that this is not where

we are headed. With only two partners worthy of the name, we are sliding toward permanent conflict. Laws and decrees have been given the same status. We should have maintained a hierarchy of standards, at least for joint matters. The two communities are closing each other off more and more. The economic crisis is accentuating the difficulties. Methods for economic recovery are looked at differently in the two regions and Flanders has the impression that it is paying for Wallonia. The regions are taking power from the state bit by bit, are intervening on economic markets and upsetting competition.

The Five National Sectors

Should the five national sectors be regionalized? A consistent industrial policy would require this, but these three Flemish economists believe that it would be dangerous unless a strict national code regarding competition subsidies and national orders is quickly established, followed by national supervisory institutions. In fact, these economists have put their finger on the primary economic advantage of a united Belgium: each region can benefit from a larger market, more interregional trade and a certain amount of complementarity between regions. If the unity of the economic market is comprised, these advantages disappear.

These economists emphasize that it would be better to regionalize sectors such as education and the infrastructure than to focus on economic sectors.

Speaking about the regionalization of credit, they discuss the Flemish fears. They believe that under these conditions the Walloons will politicize credit even more in order to intervene in their economy despite the conditions of healthy management. Flanders wants to regionalize credit because it has the impression it is paying for Wallonia's deficit but, on the contrary, this would be to depoliticize public credit institutions even more.

In this slide toward separatism, the Belgian franc would be threatened. "If there is not a consensus on national economic rules, Belgian monetary unity will not survive until 1990. We could see a Walloon franc and a Flemish franc appear."

A Walloon Franc and a Flemish Franc

This is the first time that monetary separatism in Belgium has been foreseen so distinctly. The Flemish economists discuss the disadvantages of a "Belgian franc": if a region has problems, it cannot use monetary means and devaluations to solve them. It is impossible for one region to conduct specific policy as regards interest rates, prices and taxes. The European monetary system broke up because the countries undergoing the crisis did not want to take the necessary recovery measures and because the rich countries did not want to pay for the others. Similarly, Flanders has had enough of paying for Wallonia's escapades. The last devaluation of the franc was perhaps not due to Flanders' poor economic policy.

If Belgian monetary unity disappeared, say these three economists, Brussels and Wallonia would suffer the most because Flanders is better anchored on foreign markets and more independent of the Belgian market. If we are headed towards autonomy, "You could assume that the exchange rate of the Flemish franc would rise and that of the Walloon franc would fall and who, in these conditions, would want to exchange current Belgian francs for Walloon francs? We would have to force French-speaking Belgium to make this exchange."

Autonomous Flanders could then define its economic policy itself. "If it had been autonomous earlier, would it have waited until 1982 to adjust the index?" And if Flanders lost its Walloon hinterland, say these economists, it could more easily define a joint economic policy with Holland and Germany than with Wallonia. There would of course still be the problem of dividing up Belgium's resources: gold reserves and highways, for example. But the largest problem would be that of Brussels. "Brussels has everything to lose in this process. Two-thirds of its current activity is linked to the rest of the country. To restrict the damage, it will undoubtedly be better for it to align with Flanders."

Flanders Is Divided

These are the conclusions of these three economists. They elicit a number of comments. First of all, it should be emphasized that they take up the old ideas of an incorporation of Brussels into Flanders and frontal attacks against the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers]. From an economic point of view, this study is obviously very neoliberal inspired. Its credo is market economy and free competition, and its nightmare, the idea of a Wallonia under a socialist economy. However, these suppositions undoubtedly need to be explained. There have been many interventions by the central state, which has already upset the free competition among regions and among economic sectors. On the other hand, the Flemish areas are undoubtedly exaggerating the Walloon desire to choose a socialist economy.

In Flanders itself, the left wing of the Flemish CVP [Flemish Social Christian Party] and the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] do not exactly share the viewpoint of these economists. They are the ones who have demanded the regionalization of the five national sectors. In reality, Flanders is divided between two contradictory feelings. The first is that it is a strong central government that has given the Flemish (and Walloon) economy a larger territory. The other feeling is of being robbed by the financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia and of it being better if everyone could decide on his own, for himself, with his own resources. Neounitarianism and federalism are found side by side in the Flemish parties. The outcome of their debate will undoubtedly influence the upcoming history of Belgium.

9720
CSO: 3100/765

TUNC EXAMINES PROSPECTS FOR LABOR PEACE

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 25 Jul 82 p 4

[**"By the Sweat of the Brow" column by Halil Tunc: "To Be Confident of Our Future"**]

[Text] The concepts of social government, social justice and social security have been the most captivating ideas and the most commonly used terms of our time. For those who work, these concepts are sacred in the true sense of the word. Social security, in particular, is a rallying point for those who work to feel secure about today and tomorrow and to insure the safeguards which will neutralize and prevent any threat to that feeling of security.

In keeping pace with the progress of science, social welfare has gone through certain stages of evolution:

--The assistance of one individual to another for the purpose of performing a good deed and achieving comfort of conscience.

--The concentration of individual contributions in the hands of an organization which would distribute them to the needy.

--And, finally, the assumption of the welfare function by the government and the organization of this function accordingly.

In searching for the roots of the social security system, we can find the best examples in our own history.

The idea of concentrating individual contributions in the hands of one organization which would channel those contributions to the needy led, in our history, to the establishment of Evkaf [Religious Trusts Administration]. In purpose of establishment, this institution strikes us as being ahead of its time. Because it has used its resources to found lasting institutions of charity and to help the truly needy and not to blunt the working power of people.

Evkaf has created institutions which are the crown jewels of our history of civilization. Moreover, Evkaf has not remained merely an institution of solidarity in our social life. By organizing mutual assistance, Evkaf has, during the period it functioned properly, helped to maintain the integrity and unity of our nation and to earn respect and adoration for our country abroad.

In the West, the roots of social security goes back to charity provided by wealthy individuals, churches, hospitals and care centers to alleviate poverty and misery and later on to the efforts of some professional organizations to reform the working conditions of factory workers. Efforts to alleviate poverty and official government assistance emerged in the form of social relief five or six centuries ago and over time evolved into a social security system. The first official assistance was provided in England in 1536. By taking measures to prevent unemployment, to protect the elderly, the needy, children and the disabled workers, to provide adequate wages and to secure the social rights of workers toiling under the deteriorating conditions of industrial life, England became the cradle of the social security system. With the introduction of the "Beveridge Plan," England perfected its social security system and set an example to the world.

Unemployment insurance, undoubtedly, occupies the most important place in the social security system. It is possible to see this in advanced social security systems.

The social security of workers, which is one of the most important problems of the nations of the world, and measures which need to be taken with regard to those who remain without work continues to be one of the major issues in our country. Although government officials have periodically announced that unemployment insurance will be introduced, practical progress has failed to materialize.

Continuous employment is the cause and the result of economic development. In our economically less-developed country, the issue of growth is directly linked with the unemployment problem. It will take many more years to eradicate this problem completely. Consequently, the introduction of a minimum level of unemployment insurance is imperative in our country until such time as full employment is achieved.

To such a proposal, the authorities will respond by talking about limited resources. Here, it must be noted that the social security contributions collected from workers are not very low and that, furthermore, while all governments around the world contribute to the social security system, in our country such a contribution does not exist.

In England, where the social security system is in its most perfect form, social security contributions work on a three-way basis. Depending on the type of insurance--for example, differences exist for male and female workers--the government contributes between 24 percent and one-third of the premium, and the rest is shared by the employer and worker, with the employer carrying the larger share.

The level of civilization and development of a country is nowadays measured by the number of people it can bring under its social security umbrella.

It must be well understood that a properly functioning social security system which covers the majority of a society can act as a vehicle which can foster feelings of national unity and integrity in that society.

There is joy of life in places where the social security system is implemented extensively and effectively.

There is labor peace in places where the social security system is implemented properly and in an organized manner.

9588
CSO: 4654/405

MUMCU CALLS FOR MEASURES TO PROTECT SMALL BUSINESS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Jun 82 pp 1, 11

[Text] Low demand within the internal market is leading to a succession of bankruptcies among small businesses. The "case of the brokerage firms" represented the clear bankruptcy of the measures of 24 January 1980 and was ignored. In the days to come the "case of the banks" will constitute the primary agenda item. We hope that adequate attention will be given to this event.

It is inevitable that as internal demand declines and disappears, small businesses will go under one after another. If the relationship between banks, companies, producers and consumers is not taken into consideration within the context of the money-credit system, bank failures similar to brokerage firm bankruptcies and accompanied by corporate failures will follow one another.

Not a single small merchant, small entrepreneur or industrialist is pleased with the measures of 24 January 1980. The owners of small enterprises are now gloomily immersed in deep thought. It is inevitable that in the days and years to come this economic collapse will give rise to many social problems. It is for this reason that we must focus as of today upon a "series of measures" to bring a solution to these problems and to protect society from the destructive results of this collapse.

Let us give you a concrete example. A tire factory employing 308 workers in Izmir has filed a request for bankruptcy at the Second Commercial Court of Izmir. The workplace has been closed down and the workers at the plant have been "placed on unpaid leave." The factory belongs to the "Kent Tire Industries and Commerce Corporation." In filing for bankruptcy the company has maintained that "its bank credits have been terminated, that it finds itself in the midst of a shortage of energy and raw materials

and that its bonds worth 20,000,000 Turkish liras have been protested in the absence of payment."

Company officials who filed for bankruptcy at the Second Commercial Court of Izmir did not provide this court with the required "intervening balance" sheets and failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for 5 May 1982. The officials indicated that they would drop at this time their request to bring about the legal bankruptcy of their organization. In ordinary law courts such an attitude (would leave the disposition of the case) to procedural channels. In this case however the company has ceased to pay the wages of 308 employees, undertaken the legal steps required to declare bankruptcy and then for some reason has changed its intention to file for bankruptcy. The factory is located on Birinci Irim Street within the village of Camdibi. The village is within the district of Bornova in the province of Izmir. It was determined subsequently that the factory is collateral to a loan of 279,000,000 Turkish liras from "Turkiye Is Bankasi."

In a situation such as this, the interests of three distinct parties become involved. The workers are interested in receiving their wages, the employer is interested in declaring bankruptcy and minimizing his losses while the bank will strive to place the factory on sale so that it can recover the credits that it formerly extended. At this time, the workers are saying: "We want our wages, and furthermore we don't wish to remain unemployed." To this, the employer is replying: "There is nothing to be done, I have gone bankrupt." The bank on the other hand, remains the payee as stipulated by the collateral agreement and is adamant about recovering its money. How is this problem to be resolved?

The workers will seek the initiation of formal bankruptcy proceedings in order to recover their wages while the employer will attempt to gain time by delaying his application for legal bankruptcy. Meanwhile, the director of the bank will make plans to reclaim ownership of the factory as soon as possible. Yes, how is this problem to be resolved?

There are other places and instances where similar events are occurring. In days to come, we shall live through even more saddening events. For this reason, we should as of today, do whatever is possible to take lasting measures that will prevent such bankruptcies or that will alleviate the destructive consequences of bankruptcies that can not be prevented.

The stock brokers' incident has caught the state, the bureaucracy as well as society very unprepared and very inexperienced. We now benefit from the experience provided by the stock brokers' incident. We should use the lesson that we have learned to closely follow such incidents or such bankruptcies and to consider as soon as possible the solutions that are required.

These bankruptcies were not prevented by applauding the measures of 24 January 1980 and by declaring that day to be a holiday. At this time, it would not be possible to prevent or to delay such incidents by getting angry at those who criticised the measures. This is not the time to get angry, but the time to take fundamental measures that will prevent the incidents. We must spend our time not for the purpose of getting angry but for the purpose of taking preventive measures. This is so because these bankruptcies are not incidents recorded at a police precinct.

9491
CSO 4654/366

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

VALUE OF LIRA AGAINST FOREIGN CURRENCIES EYED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 15 Jun 82 p 1

Text Teletype machines at the Central Bank began to work at around 23:00 hours Sunday night. It was announced that as of yesterday, the foreign exchange rates made public on Friday were being changed. The new rates were communicated on time to only the Istanbul, Ankara and possibly the Izmir editions of no more than three newspapers. The changes were announced by radio during the late news Sunday night and the morning news on Monday. We believe that the rate changes could not be communicated to many branch offices in very many locations of the country. We don't know what exchange rates were used for foreign currency transactions and we hope that no serious confusion took place.

In comparison to the previously announced exchange rates, the new rates amounted to devaluations of the Turkish Lira by 2.1 percent vis a vis the U.S. Dollar, 3.4 percent vis a vis the German Mark and 2.9 percent vis a vis the Dutch Guilder. On the other hand, the Turkish Lira gained in value by 4.6 percent in relation to the French Franc and 1.8 percent in relation to the Italian Lira. This was the first time since the adoption of the system of daily determined exchange rates that such an event was taking place. What could have been the reasons behind it?

Finance ministers from the European Economic Community had met Saturday night and had decided to increase the value of the German Mark while bringing about a devaluation of the French Franc and the Italian Lira within the context of the European currency system. The exchange rate changes brought by the Central Bank were based upon these decisions. However, the changes brought to the exchange rates in Turkey also involved the U.S. Dollar and moreover, the impact upon money markets of the decision taken by the finance ministers of the European Economic Community had not yet

become clear. The increase brought to the value of the German Mark as well as the devaluation of the French Franc and the Italian Lira represented decisions that ratified earlier developments within money markets. Undoubtedly, this will influence money markets. Yet as the Central Bank proceeded with bringing changes to the exchange rate, the nature of this influence was not known because the money markets were closed.

Moreover, Central Bank Director Osman Siklar and Assistant Director Yavuz Canevi as well as Foreign Exchange Bureau General Director Zekeriya Yildirim were out of the country. Who then, had taken the decision on behalf of the Central Bank to lower the value of the Turkish Lira vis a vis the U.S. Dollar and the German Mark without knowledge of developments in money markets?

Another unanswered question involves the issue of how the exchange rates for the Turkish Lira will be affected if as the result of the decision taken by finance ministers of the European Economic Community the U.S. Dollar and the German Mark increase in value within money markets. If the option of devaluation is to be used in the case of the Turkish Lira would this not amount to two devaluations in response to a single event?

In any case, for some time now the Turkish Lira has been losing its value vis a vis foreign currencies (primarily the U.S. Dollar and the German Mark) at a rate that is much greater than necessary. It has been announced that inflation has been running at an approximate rate of 12 percent since the beginning of the year. Even if we disregard the rate of inflation in foreign countries, a devaluation in the neighborhood of 10 percent would make it possible for foreign currency exchange rates to be adjusted in terms of inflation rates prevailing in Turkey. Yet since the beginning of the year, the Turkish Lira has been devalued by 16.3 percent vis a vis the U.S. Dollar, as if in response to an approximate inflation rate of 20 percent. Why must this decline be further accelerated at this time?

For some time, Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal has been answering such criticism by saying that "our exchange rate is not tantamount to our honor." We understand that exchange rates should not be made a matter of pride or considered to be points of honor. What we don't understand is why every opportunity is being used to bring about yet another devaluation.

JULY POLL RESULTS SHOW INCREASED PAPANDREOU POPULARITY

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 30 Jul 82 p3

[Text]

After a slight drop in June, Prime Minister Papandreu's popularity has risen again in July. This fact was reported in a poll carried out by the Metrix Research Center for the magazine 'Tachydromos'. It must be pointed out, however, that during the course of the research the government undertook its cabinet reshuffle and the Prime Minister announced his exemptions from property tax, which obviously had an effect on the general public opinion.

According to the results:

48% of Greeks approve of Papandreu's policies;
17% disapprove of his policies, but feel it is the handling of the policies which is more at fault;
20% answered that they didn't know or couldn't form an opinion;
43% of those in favour were women and 57% were men.
The poll was held in Athens, Salonica, Patras, Larissa, Agrinio, Heraklion, Serres and Alexandroupolis. 1,386 people were interviewed on a random basis.

Question: Are you in favour or against Prime Minister Papandreu's handling of the country's policies?

	April	May	June	July
In favour	48%	52%	45%	48%
Against	12%	15%	20%	17%
Don't know	24%	23%	24%	20%
Refused to answer	16%	10	11%	15%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

CSO: 4600/714

POLITICAL

GREECE

INTRAPASOK CHANGES, ALLEGED MACHINATIONS ANALYZED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 13 Jul 82 p 5

/Exclusive article by Titos Athanasiadis: "How and From Where Opposition Is Being Manifested Following the Government 'Restructuring'"//

/Text/ The government restructuring last week caused an "earthquake" within PASOK that was accompanied --as we said yesterday-- by "after-shock tremors" that threaten the fragile cohesion of government and party.

In yesterday's column, we referred to the dismissal by the government of three /as published/ of its primary cadres:

1. Mr A. Lazaris who for about 6 years was the closest coworker of Mr Papandreu on economic policy issues and had put his personal stamp on the drafting of the pre-election PASOK proclamations and program --documents on which the success of the movement was in large part based. 2. Mr Georgios Petsos, deputy from Pella, who in his position as deputy minister of national defense and also from his seat in parliament during the period 1977-1981 made a great impression with the seriousness with which he handled various issues and his responsibility as a public servant. 3. Mr Io. Papaspyrou who was one of the oldest PASOK deputies in the history of the movement (since 1974) and one of its founding cadres who was very active in the resistance movement. 4. Mr Khr. Rokofylllos who in his position as parliamentary deputy (1977-1981) and as director of the ATE /Agricultural Bank of Greece/ (following the elections) revealed rare qualities.

These four cadres were victims of forces that are to be found either in the all-powerful executive office or in "Mr Papandreu's court" that exerts unusually great influence.

In fact, Mr Rokofylllos --because of the fight being waged against him by the party establishment-- lost his parliamentary seat in Aitoloakarnania in the 1981 elections, while another time, in 1975, he met with the avenging wrath of the party steamroller when he was dismissed from the party together with many other cadres!

Nevertheless, the case of these four PASOK cadres are not the only ones. There are others against whom the blacklisting machine, set up in the labyrinth of the executive office and the "Papandreou court," "is working."

"Tough Nut"

An indirect and primary goal of the steamrolling course of the "Jacobins" of "Change" is now Deputy Minister of Interior Stathis Panagoulis.

The "beheading" of Mr Panagoulis has been attempted many times in the past, but either because he is considered to be a tough nut or because the party establishment is afraid of an explosion among the grass roots elements because of the influence that the name of the Panagoulis family has on them, Mr Stathis Panagoulis has remained in his position.

The "Party Establishment" Against Mr Stathis Panagoulis

The War of the Descendants and the Role of Mr Alevras

The war against Mr Panagoulis is not a recent one. It has its roots in the previous parliamentary period (1977-1981) when quite a few young deputies had gathered around the young deputy of the Second District of Athens and had formed a sort of group. But not a "splinter" group. A group with ideological concerns and problems and whose goal was the protection and preservation of the principles of the movement from the "intrigues" of the party establishment. The political orientation of the Panagoulis group was and is socialist, in the vein of the Italian Socialist Party and the ideological line of the president of Italy, Mr Pertini.

The Zafeiropoulos Suggestion

The Panagoulis group suffered a severe setback before the elections when the party establishment excluded three incumbent deputies from PASOK electoral coalitions! One of them is today a monarch. The other two, however, even with grass roots influence, were not reinstated. One of them is the "father" of the "restructuring." In fact, Mr Zafeiropoulos, former PASOK deputy, had drafted a renovation in the organization and functioning of the ministerial council that he called "restructuring." Mr Zafeiropoulos sent a copy of his study to Mr Andreas Papandreou. And it is surprising that many of the changes that took place were in the Zafeiropoulos plan, to such an extent, in fact, that there is an impression that the restructuring was based on the recommendations of the former PASOK deputy in which certain changes were made.

However, even during the pre-electoral period, Mr Panagoulis was the target of invisible forces of the party establishment that sought his electoral defeat. In vain, of course, since the people of the Second District of Athens sent Panagoulis to parliament with approximately 50,000 votes, second deputy in his region above many others who today have ministerial positions, such as Mr Kharalambopoulos or Mr Veryvakis.

It is characteristic of the war that has been launched against Mr Panagoulis by the party establishment that his participation in the first Papandreu government as deputy minister was not announced immediately after the establishment of this government. It is also characteristic that his entry into the government was decided on on the condition that he would be given a position that would be under the direct surveillance of the executive office. Such a position was the one of deputy minister of interior, an area that is under the control of Minister of Interior Gennimatos, one of the strongest members of the executive office.

First on the Blacklist

The war against Mr Panagoulis increased during the spring when the composition of the government was being cooked up behind-the-scenes at Kastri and the executive office.

According to fully reliable information, Mr Panagoulis was among the first on the blacklist of proscriptions. Perhaps for tactical reasons, information was being given out that he was among the most certain to remain in the government, while there was also information being put out that there was a possibility that he might even be considered for a ministerial post.

All of that, however, aimed at preventing any kind of opposition by the grass roots elements that would have resulted in the thwarting of the overthrow of Mr Panagoulis.

There was, nevertheless, one factor that could not be ignored: The success of Mr Panagoulis in his position.

- Mr Papandreu is said to have told one of his close coworkers, "How can I ignore Panagoulis who is a successful deputy minister?"

The party establishment, however, had another view. It is believed that it would be able to "defenestrate" Panagoulis, bringing about his resignation, thus using the method (forced to retire) that was employed for the "beheading" of Mr Petsos.

They Do Not Say "Good Morning"

There was once a police officer who in the past, in 1976, had, during the course of a beat, created an incident to the detriment of Mr Panagoulis, a situation that resulted in the PASOK's politician being hospitalized for a week.

In a statement issued, Mr Papandreu had said at the time that thanks to the timely intervention by the doctors Mr Panagoulis' life was saved.

This officer, therefore, was now up for promotion. His promotion was certain to provoke a case for Mr Panagoulis who would request that this not take place because he himself would be affected. The government --in accordance with the "scenario" of the executive office-- would have expressed its sorrow over the coincidence but would not give way to Mr Panagoulis' demand and would have left the deputy minister of interior exposed, while at the same time it would have created for him a problem of conscience that would be tantamount to forcing him to resign.

In fact, when Mr Panagoulis was informed of the possible promotion of Police Chief Second Class Io. Giannopoulos (the name of the police officer who created the incident to the detriment of the then PASOK politician), he expressed his opposition to the minister of public order. And when the promotion did take place, Mr Panagoulis' reaction became even stronger. The deputy minister of interior stopped saying good morning to the minister of public order and informed Mr Papandreu of his dissatisfaction.

The party establishment "was rubbing its hands." Mr Panagoulis would resign before the government reshuffle, as related by information being spread by the entourage of the deputy minister of interior.

But then something happened that the forces that were pulling the rug from under Mr Panagoulis' feet had not foreseen. Friends of Mr Panagoulis and cadres of the party apparatus with influence among the grass roots elements imposed their opinion --that he had to remain in the government to fight within its ranks against plots of the establishment and the tactics of proscription, so that the more reasonable forces might prevail.

Mr Panagoulis, however, did not resign. His decision put the government and the party establishment in a difficult position because the war that was being waged against him for months was brought to light. And because it consolidated the belief (in fact, after the Drettakis, Lazaris, etc. cases) among other government and party officials that at any given moment it was possible that they too would be abandoned if the party establishment so desired. Thus, instead of the party establishment having brought Mr Panagoulis to a "checkmate" position, it was Mr Panagoulis who had "checkmated" the PASOK establishment.

In accordance with information from members of the parliamentary group, the cases of Messrs Petsos and Panagoulis and the opposition of the PASOK strongmen to them are not fortuitous events.

The War of the Descendants

According to the same information, a relentless war of descendants is being waged. A war among three "Dauphins:" Messrs Koutsogiorgas, Tsokhatzopoulos and Gennimatas. And one phase of this war was waged against the "restructuring."

Certain parliamentary cadres of the movement and even more of those outside of parliament have gathered around these three ministers. These three cliques are at present controlled by the so-called "Papandreou court" --the behind-the-scenes group with the strongest influence toward the prime minister.

There are, however, two categories of parliamentary cadres and those outside of parliament who are avoiding being drawn into one of these cliques of the "troika" or into the "court." These cadres, who are constantly growing in number, are dissatisfied. And they are gathering mainly around Mr I. Alevras, president of parliament, who is said to have become most bitter over the war of cliques and the bad suggestions being given to the party leader. He himself had in the past experienced a form of this war when he confronted the contesting of his authority as a parliamentary representative of the movement in parliament during the period 1977-1981 and as second in rank in the party by the current most powerful minister to the prime minister, Mr Koutsogiorgas.

The position of Mr Alevras as president of parliament has strengthened his older paternalistic role in the movement and contributes to having all the disappointed and dissatisfied PASOK deputies turn to him.

Within the context of this role, Mr Alevras is informed of all that is happening, even in ministerial offices, and quite often, as a "fireman," he hastens to prevent the spreading of the "fire" to other party divisions.

The Younger Dauphins

There is, nevertheless, one other category, namely that of mainly new cadres who feel that PASOK will be saved from a future foundering by a reaction, a war of its new forces against the party establishment. For that reason, they look forward to new capable individuals to take the party staff directly from the first "generation" without the second "generation" intervening --that is, the generation of Koutsogiorgas.

Representatives of this third generation are currently said to be the young, both in age and mentality, Messrs G. Petsos and Sp. Panagoulis. The former expresses the expectations of the young who are positioned in the center area of PASOK. The expectations of the moderate. The latter expresses the hopes of the more radical elements of the movement, the socialists who, nevertheless, do not leave the democratic and national line.

5671
CSO: 4621/461

ARTICLE NOTES ANXIETY IN KKE

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 20 Jun 82 p 4

[Article by Spyros Linardatos: "Anxieties in the KKE and Damaging Over-simplifications"]

[Text] Some possible developments in leftist circles appear to bother the KKE leadership. At least that is what was indicated in a strange publication of the party's official newspaper with no subsequent follow up. According to this 6 June publication, the "leadership of PASOK" is "working methodically toward an anti-KKE grouping in wider leftist circles." According to "information" by the same "reporter, it was decided to provide financial and political support of these 'initiatives' of the so-called anti-dogmatic group for the creation of an anti-KKE political structure that will unite the peripheral groups and forces to the left as much as possible."

It is evident that this publication is not supported by information that could at least be considered important. PASOK has stated repeatedly that it intends to group the broader leftist circles within its own ranks. That is something it has achieved at least electorally to a significant degree. It is natural for PASOK to aim for this since it is trying to achieve the same thing in the socialist Left circles in Greece. Besides, it is evident at this time that it is not possible to unite the forces that fall between PASOK and the KKE. The two principal, but small, parties representing these forces, the KEE Interior and the EDA [United Democratic Left], have big differences in their structures, their organizational policies, and their political platforms. The KKE Interior is conducting an intensive campaign against the government. It goes as far as to say that the government has "put the country in the NATO cage again" (the tenor of the headlines in AVGI and RIZOSPASTIS the day after the prime minister returned from Bonn was not a coincidence) and that the government retreats under the pressure of the oligarchy and the "establishment." Generally, the KKE Interior competes with the KKE in anti-government campaigning.

On the other hand, the EDA supports the government and participates in government responsibilities with its limited forces to a certain point (two of its officials were assigned nomarchs, one of them to the largest nomarchy of the country). Even though on many points regarding policy decisions (especially

in anything that has to do with the appreciation of "existing socialism"), as well as with the composition of the new Executive Office of the KKE Interior, a certain tempering of views and tendencies is expressed, it is evident that the congress produced reinforced "groups" that press for a more intense confrontation with both PASOK and the KKE for a larger "ideologicalization" and therefore a "turning inward." Besides, it is indicative that the Congress did not even deal with the subject of changing the title that undoubtedly brands it as a "temporary" party or a section of the formerly unique KKE with its own ideological tint. At a time when the inner crisis of the KKE Interior continues and may even become intensified, it is utopian to talk about the unification of the "wider Left." Even among the thousands of leftists who have not chosen sides, whether they come from the EDA and the two KKE's, or whether they come from PASOK, there are so many ideological and political differences that their unification into a single party would be a miraculous feat.

With these facts, it is difficult for the "reporter" to convince anyone from the official publication of the KEE, that PASOK, or even certain circles within it, have decided to achieve this feat, setting aside their own aim to effect "our national popular unity" within the bosom of the movement. There is, of course, the view that the leadership of the KKE is worried about the proposals and ideas that are offered for uniting the "renovating forces" and that these possibly may be heard in the congress of the Administrative Committee of the EDA that went into session Saturday. For this reason, the KKE leadership is trying to undermine any such effort as being sponsored by the government to hurt the "only party of the labor class." The publication of RIZOSPASTIS, however, refers to another possibility, to make sure it is covered: that is that the government is trying to "revitalize the EDA to polarize the anti-KKE forces." But beyond the sin committed by the television people who broadcast a certain announcement of the EDA and from certain "rumors" that Manolis Glezos may be appointed as a minister, the publication does not provide other "facts" to support its contention. On the other hand, it may be noted as a counter point that for the first time since the 1950's, EDA was not assigned a separate office in Parliament.

Thus it is claimed that the leadership of the KKE really worries about the impasse created by its own anti-government and anti-PASOK policy. In fact, at this moment, the KKE has designated the government as its principal target. It is undermining the government with its publications, its announcements and its intense campaign as well as with its support of strikes crucial to the economy of the country and its propaganda by rumor.

Many members of the KKE express their worry about where this policy will lead to since it tends to erode the government without bringing about any important benefits to the party itself as evident from elections in trade unions, associations, and other mass organizations.

In other words, the only result of this intense anti-PASOK campaign that has nothing to do with constructive criticism, is to aggravate the discontent of some of the people due to the difficult economic situation and the status of the country in general as well as the undisputed errors of the government and

its bad handling of various situations. This campaign also erodes the forces of the Left and of Change and perhaps even the parliamentary structure itself. Many members of the KKE worry about their party's policies that seem to parallel the opposition of the Right in many cases, especially when alliances of the Right with the KKE appear in mass organizations.

Certain people believe that this tactic of the KKE, especially on matters concerning foreign policy is designed to exert some pressure on the government to get out of NATO and the EEC, to accept an alliance between Kyprianos and AKEL to open the way to a PASOK-KKE "front."

Still others who basically make the same assessment believe that the Soviet leadership, and the KKE by association, prefer a rightist government in NATO countries rather than a socialist one that "confuses the fronts" from the time it accepts the Atlantic Alliance.

Others, however, support that the KKE, simply by becoming entangled in its claims that the KKE expresses true change, that the "popular struggles" must be intensified to exert pressure on the government, that the "party of labor class" is obligated to reinforce its strength and its separate features, returns to the policy of: "what is the difference, Plastiras or Papagos," becoming indifferent to the more general consequences to the political life of the country. In relation to this, it is recalled that the most important leaders of the KKE had never sincerely accepted the criticism that had been made regarding Zakhariadis' mistakes during the period 1950 to 1956 or the contradictory policy of the left against the government of G. Papandreu from 1963 to 1965. Thus substantially they are returning to the "old shoe policy" of inflexibility and extremism that helped the conservative forces and the foreign powers so well in attacking the popular movement.

Without a doubt, even the members of the KKE consider the policy of undermining the first Greek socialist government, but not in terms of a productive and necessary criticism of its work, its unrealistic and will only lead to a retrogression of our political life. During such a difficult international and domestic economic situation, when the Soviet leadership itself openly is invoking the Yalta agreement for the first time to support the coup d'etat in Poland, when, in our own neighborhood, the Palestinian people are being decimated with American weapons and substantially, with the silent tolerance of all the larger and smaller forces, when we have a permanent threat to the integrity of our country from Turkey, it is natural that political oversimplifications will not be productive, such as "putting the country in the NATO cage" "submission to the oligarchy" that are being tried by the KKE interior. These tactics have proven to be damaging from many points of view.

9346
CSO: 4621/405

POLITICAL

GREECE

OPPOSITION PAPER ATTACKS ERT POLICY ON LEBANON CRISIS

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 16 Jul 82 p 2

/Editorial: "Are We Organs of Mr 'Arafat?"/

/Text/ We would very much like to know to whom ERT /Greek Radio and Television/ and YENED /Armed Forces Information Service/ belong. To the Greek state or to Mr 'Arafat? Since the start of the events in Lebanon, unprecedented and inconceivable things have been happening at the two stations. They give us the impression that the Palestinian question is our most important national issue. Only thetriumphs of Mr Papandreu on the international stage overshadow it from time to time. But even the way in which they present it has no connection with what is considered as providing information. It concerns concentrated daily propaganda unbearably one-sided, violent, biased and distorted that gives a completely false picture of reality to the Greek public. We do not know what more ERT and YENED could do if they were not managed by individuals appointed by the Greek Government but directly by Mr 'Arafat's PLO. In accordance with the line being followed, there are only two colors: white and black. The absolutely good Palestinians and the absolutely bad Israelis. The former have all the right on their side while the latter have all the wrong. None of these gentlemen who have undertaken to "enlighten" us never took the trouble to settle for us a few reasonable doubts and answer questions dealing with the issues. For example, there is the impressive fact that absolutely no Arab country wants to have the PLO on its territory. Even the Lebanese Government, for the first time the day before yesterday, dared call for the immediate withdrawal of the Palestinian guerrillas. Why are the Arab countries maintaining this position? Are they afraid of Israeli reprisals or are they perhaps more afraid of the PLO refugees? And what is Greece gaining by standing unreservedly by an organization that is undesirable in all Arab countries? Does it not thus come into opposition with the latter countries, damaging our national interests? Only the endless foolishness of our foreign policy can explain this paradox.

5671

CSO: 4621/461

POLITICAL

GREECE

MORE DETAILS ON MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS PROCEDURES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jun 82 p 1

[Text] The text of the bill that modifies the code regarding municipalities and communities was released for publication yesterday by the Ministry of the Interior. The most important provisions of the bill call for:

--The minimum age to qualify for candidacy is reduced from 23 to 21.

--Some of the obstructing and irreconcilable provisions are being abolished. Civil servants, military personnel and employees of OTA [Organizations of Local Self-Government] will not be eligible to run for mayors or community presidents or council members.

--Transfer to another municipality is permitted in the case where someone who is not a resident of the municipality intends to run in the municipal elections. This right may be exercised from 1 August to 15 September during the electoral year.

--In every municipality with a population of over 10,000 residents, the mayor will be helped by assistant mayors. Their number will increase according to the population of the municipality.

--The right of the monarch to penalize municipal officials is abolished, especially his right to impose fines. The right to impose penalties will belong only to the provided council made up of judicial members.

--The municipal council is made up of 11 members in municipalities with up to 7,000 residents; 15 members in municipalities with 7,001 to 20,000 residents; 19 in municipalities with 20,001 to 30,000 residents; 25 in municipalities with 30,001 to 60,000 residents; 31 in municipalities with 60,001 to 100,000 residents; 35 in municipalities with 100,001 to 150,000 residents; 39 in municipalities with 150,001 to 500,000 residents; and 41 in municipalities with 500,001 or more residents.

9346
CSO: 4621/404

POLITICAL

GREECE

POSSIBILITY OF NO ND MAYORAL CANDIDATES IN PIRAEUS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 19 Jun 82 p 1

[Text] The possibility that ND will not submit its own candidate in Piraeus is being studied seriously by officials of ND who stated their opinions on the matter during a recent party meeting. Specifically, after the absolute refusal of the two local parliamentary deputies, Messrs Andreas Andrianopoulos and Sotirios Papapolitis to run for mayor in Piraeus, the prevailing opinion is to let Mr Ar. Skylitsis, who was the rightist mayor during the dictatorship and who insists on running himself for the Right.

According to the supporters of this point of view, Mr Skylitsis will be supported again by the largest portion of the rightist vote in Piraeus and thus the ND candidate, especially when he is not a person of some influence, will experience an overwhelming defeat just as he did during the 1978 municipal elections.

On the other hand, other officials of ND that make up the leading section of the Committee for municipal Elections believe that they must put up a candidate without fail. They propose former parliamentary deputy Mr Ioannis Katsafados. They believe that this will lead Mr Skylitsis to abandon his plans.

Yesterday, however, Messrs Andreas Andrianopoulos and Sotirios Papapolitis reaffirmed their statements that they will not run in Piraeus. More specifically, Mr Papapolitis, who is deemed to be the best candidate for mayor for ND because of his orientation to the Center, said that "the decision of the party to assign me as a candidate for mayor is an honor, but the people of Piraeus have honored me also as is evident by my being a parliamentary member."

ND orientation for other candidacies in the Piraeus district is focusing on businessman Mr Theof. Saitis for mayor in Ydra, civil engineer Mr Syriakos Armenakos for mayor in Spetsai, incumbent mayor Mr St. Solomonidis for Poros and Messrs Khr. Axiotis and Merk. Karydis for mayor in Aigina.

According to his statement yesterday, civil engineer Mr Vas. Leventis makes it known that he will be a candidate for mayor in Piraeus as "an extra-party man, representing the democratic array."

9346

CSO: 4621/404

CHARGES OF POLITIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Jun 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] Confusion in the diplomatic corps is getting worse as the government is exerting efforts by methodically using its power to transfer to place persons of its trust in the key positions of the diplomatic service. Some diplomats even accuse the government of "blemishing their reputations" for the purpose of pushing them aside. This accusation is associated by the same employees with the recent defamation campaign against the corps with general charges of smuggling or with a search for draft dodgers.

In connection with draft dodging, Deputy Minister I. Kapsis is stirring up a subject that had been solved under the existing legislation regarding the redemption of military service obligations. The deputy minister had made up a list of all those who did not serve in the military, but according to those who have suffered from these transfers, he was careful to send the letter described below selectively to only certain diplomatic personnel and in the harshest tone.

The letter reads: "Please inform me in writing how your capacity as permanent resident abroad came about, on the basis of which, according to the certificate submitted to the ministry that was issued by the conscription office when you were appointed to the ministry, you bought out your military obligations."

As further proof of the "tactical siege" of the diplomatic corps, the following facts are mentioned:

--A committee for the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been established. It is made up of only one representative of the diplomatic employees who is a PASOK follower, an administrative employee of the same party color, and three other members who have nothing to do with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (a university professor, a lawyer, and a director of the Ministry to the Prime Minister).

--Unbearable pressure "from above" has been exerted with indirect threats to discourage the Association of Diplomatic Employees from joining the ADEDY [Supreme Administrative Committee of Civil Servants] in their strike.

Will the 25-year limit be enforced?

According to a statement by Minister to the Prime Minister's Office Koutsogiorgas that contradicts past assurances by Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Kharalambopoulos, the law for and public administration will be enforced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This means that the 25-year limit applies to general directors. All plenipotentiary ministers first class and some second class will have to leave the service. The following experienced diplomats are among them: Messrs A. Frydas, D. Velissaropoulos, E. Lagakos, K. Tsamados, S. Stathatos, D. Frantzeskakis, G. Sekeris, E. Megalokonomos, M. Doundas, D. Irakleidis, G. Mazarakis, P. Molyviatis, and others.

Politization

All the vacancies created by enforcing the 25-year limit are being filled with party criteria and with persons whose diplomatic experience has no bearing. The objective is to control the diplomatic corps, even though it deals with national subjects that were dealt with without partisan considerations and emotions.

Finally, it is noted that within the tactic of psychological pressure on the diplomatic employees, the government does not clarify its pending decision to abolish overseas allowances and extra pay that is given to those who serve abroad, depending on local circumstances and the cost of living in every country.

9346
CSO: 4621/404

SPECULATION ON CHANGING OF PCI SECRETARY

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 25 Jul 82 pp 16-19

[Article by Fabrizio Coisson: "Enrico Is Tired, Berlinguer Is Not"]

[Text] Rome--An "always" added and a "certainly" subtracted: that is how Enrico Berlinguer's sentence was fixed up for the readers of L'UNITA. But everyone heard that clamorous sentence on television on Political Tribunal: "Whether I still have the strength, the energy to continue with my present duties, this is a question which exists and which the leadership organs will certainly discuss and about which I will have something to say myself." Never before has a PCI secretary admitted--even announced publicly--that his post was under discussion.

The next day L'UNITA rushed to correct the situation: the question of a secretary's fatigue "always exists"; it will be discussed, but no longer "certainly." With these two small changes everything could go back to normal. "Berlinguer merely repeated the rules of the game, namely that all PCI posts are always subject to verification," explains Andrea Margheri, like others who are ultraloyal to the secretary. But this explanation does not convince everyone: "Berlinguer never says a word he doesn't mean," observes someone at party headquarters. If one slipped out this time it means that the boil is there and could burst any time. What is really going on?

In fact, the "Berlinguer case" has been under discussion for at least a year at party headquarters, ever since that interview on the PCI's "diversity," which was granted to Eugenio Scalfari without any of the other big communists knowing anything about it. Some of the party's leaders became suspicious immediately. What was Berlinguer thinking of? Leading the PCI alone, in a direct relationship between charismatic leader and rank and file? Shaping the party in his own image--a little reserved, scornful, ultramoralist? It was certainly not the first time the communist party secretary acted by forcing things politically, after the breakdown of national solidarity. "He felt himself more free, he was finally able to fully show his line," say Berlinguerites. Even at the cost of breaking the unanimity (often fictitious, as Amendola said) of the preceding years.

But certain "freedoms" and turns seemed too sudden and improvised: for example when, at the end of 1980, he attacked Ingrao in the central committee,

confirming the validity of the historical compromise, and then 2 weeks later ("without even convening the central committee," recalls Giuliano Ferrara of Torino) he imposed the line of the democratic alternative, this time allying himself with Ingrao.

And what was this alternative? The strangest versions kept cropping up for months, up to that of a Savonarola-type "diversity." Even a mild, courteous man like Giorgio Napolitano entered the fray to remind him of the Togliatti lesson, the need to carry out policies, not just propaganda. An avalanche of other episodes that could be described as Berlinguerian "Caesarism" were immediately mentioned. The case of Poland, for example: everyone (except Cossutta) agreed in condemning the coup; but why not consult with two wise and experienced experts like Bufalini and Pajetta before going on television to say that the "propelling impetus" of the Soviet revolution was exhausted (a formula which has been abandoned now)?

And then that fit of nerves, the "no" to the publication of Cossutta's speech in L'UNITA. And the political casualness with which the Cirillo-Scotti case was conducted. And one more reproach: he always governs with the ultraloyal members of the secretariat, avoiding confrontation in the directorate, where he is often in the minority (at least twice in the past months).

"Gossip, gossip," reply the Berlinguerites: "The secretary is attacked personally because it is his political line that is uncomfortable." And Berlinguer, too, resorts to mass psychology: "There are fashions... when a party achieves brilliant results, its leaders are called very attractive, charming, handsome," whereas if the party loses "they become old, obsolete, tired."

Those who know Berlinguer well insist that this is one of the keys to an understanding of his personality. The breakdown of national unity, the PCI's electoral defeats have left visible traces on the secretary. "Enrico has always had a very strong sense of responsibility, of history." It has been a heavy blow for him to see the erosion of a success that had brought a communist party to the threshold of power in the West for the first time. Thus some of his characteristics have become accentuated: timidity bordering on exaggerated reserve, resoluteness bordering on obstinacy. He has cultivated excessive anxieties, sometimes within the party: for example, the fear that difficulties will lead to a "sell-out" of the party's historical patrimony, that the social democrats or the opportunists (from Napolitano to Bufalini, from Perna to Chiaromonte) may gain the upper hand. There are other revolts outside: "systematic distortions" of his thoughts, as in the case of the historical compromise, "a term I have decided not to use any more"; a malicious and maneuvered assault on the press organs: hence the peremptory orders, in the directorate, to maintain complete silence, or ostracism for the individual journalist: "I don't talk to you because you take phrases out of context and use them against the party."

Besieged on both the inside and the outside, what was Berlinguer to do but create a direct relationship for himself with the rank and file? "And besides, without this relationship who could have risked a break with the USSR?

Napolitano? Ingrao? Bufalini? Let's be serious. Didn't you applaud every time the PCI took a step away from the USSR? But who deserves the credit? And who deserves the credit for having brought the party to a peak of voter support?" continue the faithful. But the PCI is not an entity that can tolerate being guided by just one person; so the anti-Berlinguer wing becomes agitated, especially in the South; the intellectuals withdraw or laugh openly when they read that the latest administrative electoral defeat is explained by the "fact that the communist movement is certainly not on the crest of the wave in the world today" (Berlinguer to the section secretaries, 20 June 1982).

Others complain about an "obscure moralism which is in danger of pervading zones of the party," as the philosopher Biagio De Giovanni (a member of the central committee) writes. L'UNITA's readers protest because the PCI line zig-zags; but the secretary does not help them much, explaining on television that the alternative should be formed without the DC, and then sending a letter the next day to the communist paper--relegated to page four, beside an article on the dog-days--to say that in Puglia it is all right to come to an agreement with the DC and the rules that hold at the national level do not hold in the periphery. And while there is much affection in the portrait Bufalini draws for Berlinguer's 60th birthday on 25 May, there is also an allusion to the fact that running a secretariat entails "wearing fatigue and constant tension."

Wherever we look, the "Berlinguer case" comes up again, but without many solutions, given the almost sacred aura the post of secretary has in communist parties. "Technically it is true, as Berlinguer says, that a secretary can always be replaced," explains Massimo Cacciari, communist deputy and philosopher; "but substantive norms prevent this from happening; it is no accident that it occurs only due to a death or an inside coup. It is a mechanism that forces a leader to stay on in spite of himself, and become a man of all seasons." Thus together with the leader his potential successors are worn out, too.

Only one thing is possible: bring the secretary under control, recreate by force a collegial directorate: the political office, in the communist tradition. They have been talking about this for 2 years in the PCI, and for 2 years Berlinguer has been warning them that he would not accept it. A joint committee with all the most prestigious leaders on it, from Pajetta to Napolitano, from Bufalini to Ingrao, would replace his leadership in practice; "I didn't ask to be secretary, you are the ones who insisted; I am always ready to leave," Berlinguer said immediately after the 1979 electoral defeat.

It is quite probable that this is what Berlinguer will say to his comrades when the "question" is discussed (and this would be the meaning of the phrase: "I will have something to say, too"). This is more or less the opposite of what happened to Togliatti in March 1964. At that time it was the PCI secretary who asked to be replaced: "It must simply be recognized that I am unable to carry the burden of work involved in being a member of the secretariat, so I should be removed from this post," he wrote Longo.

One way or another, whether it is a political office or not, the "Berlinguer case" is already one of the unconfessed subjects of the coming national party congress. In the meantime, the secretary's critics have obtained one thing: the congress will not be held on the eve of the election, if anticipated elections take place, so it will not be reduced to an appeal to "close ranks." "It would be the fourth time, after 1972, 1975 and 1979. You can say that Berlinguer has never faced a real congress as party secretary."

9855
CSO: 3104/260

INTERNAL CRITICISM OF DC DE MITA'S POLICY

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 25 Jul 82 p 21

[Article by Guido Quaranta: "De Mita Is No Longer a Myth"]

[Text] Two months after the election, the new secretary is already being criticized in the party: he does not look ahead, he is rash....

Rome--Two weeks ago, when a friend asked him what he thought of his party's new secretary, Senate President Amintore Fanfani raised his eyes to the sky, held his arms out and exclaimed: "He is impulsive, he can't look ahead, he is reckless. I have a feeling we have fallen from the frying pan into the fire." On Monday, 12 July, Senator Carlo Donat Cattin went even farther: he wrote that "to establish his image, De Mita is making serious policy errors and making the DC run serious risks." Finally, last Wednesday, after reading in a popular paper that "the DC secretary aspires to be the successor of Alcide De Gasperi," Vice-President of the House Oscar Luigi Scalfaro remarked sarcastically: "Come on, let's not be funny. De Mita has nothing in common with De Gasperi but the "De."

The opinions beginning to circulate in the DC about Ciriaco De Mita, just 2 months after his election as secretary, do not seem very flattering. Why? Is this just passing turbulence, or is there something more to it? And how is he reacting to these heartless jibes? Let us see.

Behind the disputes which have developed during the past few days at Piazza del Gesu, headquarters of the DC, is the secretary's behavior--bold at first, later accommodating--during the recent diatribe about the sliding scale which has divided the major coalition party from its four allies. Senator Luigi Granelli, advocate of the base, criticizes De Mita for having demanded its immediate modification even at the cost of the fall of Giovanni Spadolini: "If this had caused a crisis for the government and the crisis had led to new elections in October, we would have been in a nasty position. Fortunately, he later retreated." Minister of the Merchant Marine Lillo Mannino, of moderate origin, accuses the secretary of bringing the party into a position of isolation: "First it was only the socialists who distrusted us. Now even the prime minister is against us. A fine result!" And Francesco Lussignoli,

a deputy from Brescia of the Zaccagnini group, murmurs in a worried tone of voice: "It would be better to lead a party more prudently."

But De Mita is under fire not just because he made a false step at the beginning ("The minute he moved he made the wrong switching operation and was thrown off the tracks," grins a member of the leadership, Luciano Faraguti): various people criticize his character, considering him authoritarian and arrogant. In Bologna, where the secretary presented a report a month ago to the activists and provincial leaders of Emilia-Romagna, they refer to him as a professor always lecturing: "The minute he opened his mouth he accused us of not knowing how to behave as an opposition." In Piazza del Gesu they recall uneasily that 2 weeks ago, when he received a group of American trade union representatives in his office, he made no secret of his dislike for the English language ("With me one speaks only in Italian"), leaving his guests dumbfounded. On the eve of the recent senate debate on the question of confidence in the government, he decided who should speak without consulting the president of the group, Giorgio De Giuseppe, who threatened to resign in annoyance. At the CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], the Catholic union, they complain about the "detached attitude the secretary shows concerning the workers, even though he calls himself Leftist."

This is not all. Some note that his leadership of the party has not yet produced any noticeable results; there is someone responsible in the various labor sectors, but they are slow to get moving; relations between the majority and the internal opposition, led by Arnaldo Forlani, are still very tense; IL POPOLO, the party organ, which has been entrusted to a new director, Giovanni Galloni, is still a clandestine paper like in the days of his predecessor Franco Maria Malfatti; a new trend is said to be about to form within the majority (led by Antonio Gava and Nino Gullotti).

De Mita's most loyal friends deny that he is arrogant and explain that he could not accomplish miracles in 2 months ("those who complain are in meno-pause," comments the Honorable Tarcisio Gitti), and maintain that, heedless of lack of understanding and attacks, he will reach his goal--set at the May congress which elected him--of recovering its dominant role for the DC: "For a start, we have won back the support of many small and medium businessmen who had turned their backs on us; and now that we have kept our distance from the government, we cannot be blamed for its uncertainties." As for the recent retreat about the sliding scale, Senator Vincenzo Carollo concludes slyly: "De Mita was quite right to be flexible, giving Spadolini a few months to heal the nation's economy, as he has promised. But I doubt that the prime minister will succeed. That will be when Ciriaco will show his claws. And I am sure that this time he will scratch."

9855
CSO: 3104/260

APK LEADER URGES COMPROMISE WITH USSR IN BALTIC DISPUTE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] Visby, Sunday--Understanding for the Soviet Union and hope for a boundary demarcation in the Baltic Sea based on "compromises on both sides" were the somewhat different topics chosen by Rolf Hagel, APK [Workers' Communist Party] leader, as he spoke on Sunday evening from the now-famous rostrum in Almedalen.

Hagel also said that Sweden will be able to maintain its position as an industrial country with low unemployment only by continuous advanced technical development, uranium mining, full-scale development of nuclear power, and more research, including hybrid DNA technology.

He was speaking to a small audience of exactly 18 persons who were barely aware of the party's existence.

The APK is not represented in Parliament, but it is present in quite a number of Norrbotten municipalities that are within the natural circulation area of the party newspaper, NORRSKENSFLAMMAN.

Rolf Hagel said: "We are now opposed to being regarded as a Norrbotten party. We are present today in most industrial localities, even in central and southern Sweden."

Refuses to Save VPK

He said that part of the decline experienced by the VPK [Left Party-Communists] in recent times is due to the fact that its supporters are deserting it and going over to the APK, which, according to Rolf Hagel, is the only uncompromisingly communist party in Sweden.

Carsten Thunborg, an old Communist veteran from Stockholm, did not go along with the idea that a vote for a party as small as the APK is wasted. The party's members will vote for the APK and no one else in this fall's election. They will not vote to save the VPK so it can keep its place in Parliament. That would be a betrayal of voters who need a pure communist party.

The APK feels that the VPK, like the middle parties and now the Environment Party, has been guilty of grossly betraying development by its talk about zero growth, a small-scale economy, and a return to the allegedly idyllic atmosphere of village society.

Soviet Model

The APK's model state for the achievement of socialism is the Soviet Union. Nor did Rolf Hagel have anything negative to say about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The alleged genocide there has not been proven, and the Soviet Union is there at Afghanistan's express request, he said.

He described the peace march to Minsk as very successful. According to Hagel, all the restrictions and incidents reported in that connection were only misrepresentations by the Scandinavian press.

"If there had been a lot of people around the march, it would have been said that an attempt was being made to choke it; if there had not been enough people, it would have been said that the authorities had forbidden people to take part."

11798
CSO: 3109/217

ENVIRONMENT PARTY KICKS OFF CAMPAIGN BY EMPHASIZING ECONOMY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Aug 82 p 6

[Text] Staffan Johansson of the Environment Party's Political Committee kicked off the party's election campaign on Sunday. The campaign trail will take the party from Ystad in the south to Haparanda in the north.

The party's minibus made its first stop at Tobisvik Beach in Simrishamn, where local Environment Party members reported on the problems with the municipality's sandpile. The day's last stop was in Malmo, where Staffan Johansson talked about the party's economic program.

Among other things, he said that the rapid structural change we have experienced since the war is expected to continue at an increasingly fast pace that will entail a centralization and internationalization of the economy, with the result that problems now called "Norrländska problems" will increasingly involve the entire country.

"We must struggle deliberately and with all our strength so that Sweden can survive and develop further as an independent nation.

"In order to guide the process toward a more secure existence for all people in the country, we must safeguard the most fundamental requirement: meaningful work for all. Not with coarse general measures designed to stimulate growth in a general way but with selective and well-adapted measures."

Johansson said that the central government and the municipalities must assume full responsibility for unemployment. He considered that reasonable, since society already has to bear most of the cost.

The Environment Party also wants to give the municipalities greater responsibility for the economy. There should be a greater concentration on basic production, and the establishment of large firms must be controlled.

Johansson said: "Relief work must be strengthened and increased. The current time limit on relief work must be abolished and replaced with a rule that relief work will not stop until it is possible to offer the individual a new job.

The Environment Party's goal in labor market policy is to insure that everyone will be provided with a job in his home district within 3 months of his first contact with the employment office. Young people under 20 years of age should be legally guaranteed a job, education, or practical training.

11798

CSO: 3109/217

ENVIRONMENT PARTY LEADERS REJECT WAGE-EARNER FUND

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Jul 82 p 7

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] Global solidarity, a balance with nature, and meaningful jobs for everyone are a few of the points that the Environment Party hopes will open the doors to power and Parliament this fall.

On Wednesday, therefore, the Environment Party succeeded in attracting a great many reporters when it presented its election program on two stenciled A-4 sheets.

Three spokesmen stood before the strong lights of the TV cameras to explain that a survey had been sent to the party's approximately 5,000 members, of whom 500 selected the proposals included in the program.

Among other things, the program includes an eventual 6-hour workday, rejection of forest spraying, a children's ombudsman in every municipality, and support for demands by the underdeveloped countries for solidarity in trade and greater development assistance without conditions.

The proposals will be financed by higher taxes on energy, raw materials, luxury goods, and speculative profits.

How much will the proposals cost, and how much will the higher taxes bring in?

Ralph Mono said: "We have not figured that out yet; the answer will appear in our economic program, which will be presented later."

The Environment Party rejects wage earner funds. So does the KDS [Christian Democratic Union], and that is why Alf Svensson said in Almedalen that he supports the nonsocialist bloc. But the Environment Party does not feel that the funds are so important that it wants to get tied down on the bloc issue.

Ragnhild Pohanka, currently the party's convener, said: "We stand for a new dimension that does not fit into the scale from right to left. As a single party, of course, we cannot tie ourselves down on the issue of the prime minister before the election."

Ragnhild Pohanka sharply criticized the labor unions. The union leaders are not representing the members when they continually come up with high wage demands.

"On paper, they are democratically governed. But how much influence can the members really have? Personally, I feel that the union demands in the wage negotiations are too high."

11798
CSO: 3109/217

POLL MEASURES VOTER CONCERNS AS ELECTION CAMPAIGN PICKS UP

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Aug 82 p 7

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Jobs and employment have reached the top as the most important election issue--in a class by itself--about which the voters feel that politicians ought to "do something." This is shown by a poll conducted by the IMU (Institute for Market Research) for DAGENS NYHETER. Interest in the wage earner funds has increased, but mainly among nonsocialist voters who do not want any funds at all.

Nearly 1,800 voters were asked between 15 March and 12 May to state the two most important issues in this election.


Nearly two out of three voters--61 percent--feel that jobs and employment are the most important issue. This marks a pronounced shift since the previous poll (in the spring of 1981), when the economy was given priority as the most important issue.

Sixty-one percent for jobs and employment is the highest figure noted since the surveys started in the fall of 1979.

Among Social Democratic voters, 71 percent named jobs and employment as one of the two most important issues in this election. The corresponding figure for VPK [Left Party-Communists] supporters is 70 percent, for the Conservatives 52 percent, for the Center Party 51 percent, and for the Liberal Party 48 percent. Jobs and employment were mentioned as an important issue by 58 percent of the Environment Party's supporters.

Satisfied Voters

The IMU also tried to determine how the supporters of the various parties feel that the most important issues are being handled. In the VPK, 65 percent of its voters are satisfied with their party's policy for guaranteeing jobs, compared to 61 percent of the Social Democratic Party's voters, 59 percent of the Liberal Party's voters, 57 percent of the Conservative Party's voters, and 47 percent of the Center Party's voters.



Jobs and employment are clearly the most important issue in this election. That is shown by the above diagram, based on what 1,800 voters said they regarded as the two most important issues that politicians should "do something about." The diagram also shows that the economy has fallen to second place and that the environmental issue is attracting greater interest. The responses reflect in part the political debate. Interest in energy and tax issues has waned, while interest in the wage earner funds has increased.

Key:

1. Percent	6. Economy
2. Autumn	7. Environment
3. Winter	8. Taxes
4. Spring	9. Energy
5. Jobs and employment	10. Wage earner funds

The economy is still an important issue to the voters, but it has dropped from first to second place. In the spring of 1981, 56 percent felt that the economy was an important issue, but that figure has now dropped to 33 percent.

The economy was named by 41 percent of the Conservative Party's supporters as an important issue, compared to 34 percent of the Center Party, 33 percent of the Liberal Party, 31 percent of the Social Democrats, and 30 percent of the VPK.

Social Democratic voters are those most satisfied with their party's way of managing the economy: 68 percent of them feel that the economy issue is well managed, compared to 59 percent of the Conservative Party's supporters and 50 percent of the Center Party's supporters. Liberal Party voters are clearly dissatisfied: 38 percent feel that the issue is well handled.

The environmental issue has risen to third place, with 19 percent mentioning the environment as an important issue. The IMU believes that its higher position may be linked in part to the debate surrounding the Environment Party.

Of the Environment Party's supporters, 57 percent mentioned the environment as an important issue, compared to 24 percent of the Center Party's voters, 20 percent of the VPK's voters, 18 percent of the Social Democratic voters, 16 percent of the Liberal Party's voters, and 12 percent of the Conservative voters.

Taxes

The Liberal Party's voters are those most satisfied with their party's way of approaching environmental issues: 47 percent of its supporters think the issue is well handled, compared to 45 percent of the VPK, 43 percent of the Center Party, 41 percent of the Social Democrats and the Environment Party, and 40 percent of the Conservative Party.

Taxes as an issue slipped from 19 percent when the polls started in the fall of 19'9 to 8 percent in the spring of 1982: 12 percent of the Conservatives mentioned taxes as an important issue, compared to 9 percent of the Liberal Party's voters, 7 percent of the Social Democrats, 6 percent of the Center Party's voters, and 4 percent of the VPK's voters.

The Conservative voters are those most satisfied: 79 percent of that party's supporters feel that their own party handles the tax issue well, compared to 45 percent of the Social Democratic voters. Both of the parties in the government got low figures: 27 percent of the Liberal Party's voters and 25 percent of the Center Party's supporters are satisfied with the tax policies of their parties.

Funds

Interest in the wage earner funds has increased. The funds are mentioned as an important issue by 7 percent, compared to none before. The interest appears to be mostly negative, since the funds are mentioned as an important issue chiefly by nonsocialist voters, especially the Conservative Party's supporters.

The funds are mentioned as an important issue by 12 percent of the Conservatives, 8 percent of the Liberal Party's supporters, 5 percent of the Center Party's voters and the Social Democrats, and 3 percent of the VPK's supporters.

Energy and the question of alcohol and narcotics are two issues that have dropped sharply in the polls. When the polls began in the fall of 1979, 43 percent mentioned energy as an important issue. The figure is now down to 7 percent.

In the spring of 1980, a maximum of 16 percent felt that alcohol and narcotics were an important issue. That figure is now down to 6 percent.

Two issues are new. They are health insurance and world peace, both of which are mentioned by 4 percent of the voters.

Health insurance is mentioned primarily by Social Democrats (7 percent), while world peace is mentioned mainly by VPK supporters (24 percent).

Economy a "Male" Concern

In general, the economy is emphasized by men, persons with a higher education, and Conservatives. Women are more inclined than men to mention family policy, child care, medical care and care of the elderly, and alcohol and narcotics.

The VPK's voters are those most satisfied with their own party's way of handling the issues mentioned as the two most important for politicians to do something about, while the Liberal Party's voters are those least satisfied.

Sixty percent of the VPK's voters feel that their party handles those matters well. The corresponding figures for the other parties are as follows: Social Democrats: 57 percent; Conservatives: 55 percent; Environment Party: 42 percent; Center Party: 39 percent; and Liberal Party: 33 percent.

Conservatives are especially pleased with their party's commitment to the tax issue. The Liberal Party's members are most pleased with their party's approach to unemployment, while the Center Party's members feel that way on the subject of the economy. Social Democratic supporters give that party high marks for its approach to unemployment, the economy, care of the elderly, and medical care. Child care, care of the elderly, and medical care get high marks from the VPK's members.

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POLL SHOWS NEW VOTERS OVERWHELMINGLY BACK SOCIALIST PARTY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Aug 82 p 6

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Almost one out of every two first-time voters in this year's election backs the Social Democrats.

This is shown by a special poll of party preferences among the youngest voters. It was conducted by the IMU [Institute for Market Research] for DAGENS NYHETER.

The Conservative Party is overrepresented among first-time voters, and the Liberal Party does not tempt them at all. People who abstained from voting in the 1979 election are being attracted in particular to small parties that are not represented in Parliament.

This special survey of the party preferences of first-time voters and nonvoters is based on public opinion polls conducted from September 1981 through May 1982. Over 6,000 voters were polled.

A total of 6,113,249 persons are entitled to vote in this fall's parliamentary election, and of that number, 328,765 persons born between 1961 and 1964 will be voting for the first time.

The first-time voters represent about 5 percent of the entire electorate. If they are to change the election outcome in any essential respects, big deviations in party preferences will be required.

Participation in an election usually totals about 90 percent. The number of nonvoters--about 10 percent--is approximately twice as large as the number of first-time voters. It is not always the same voters who abstain from voting time after time. Many voters would rather not vote than switch parties.

Social Democrats Most Popular

According to the poll, almost one out of every two young voters (about 20 years old) feels that the Social Democrats are the best party: 49 percent consider the Social Democrats the best party, compared to 48 percent of the population as a whole.

The Conservatives are overrepresented among first-time voters: 29 percent said the Conservative Party was the best, compared to 23.5 percent of the entire electorate.

The Liberal Party is clearly underrepresented among the youngest voters. None of them said the Liberal Party was the best, compared to 6.0 percent of the entire electorate.

The VPK [Left Party-Communists] is somewhat below the average figure, and this is a departure from the results of earlier polls.

At 43 percent, the Social Democrats are underrepresented among the nonvoters, who are attracted by the Environment Party and other small parties not represented in Parliament.

All the parties in Parliament have picked up new voters since the 1979 election, with the increase constituting from 20 to 30 percent of each party's strength.

Almost 1 out of every 10 nonvoters (9.5 percent) considers the Environment Party the best, and 4.5 percent of the nonvoters support the other small parties not represented in Parliament. These include the SKP [Swedish Communist Party], the APK [Workers' Communist Party], and the Center Democrats [as published].

New Voters

The IMU's conclusion is that over and above the voters who voted for them in the 1979 election, the Conservatives have picked up an additional 6.5 percent according to the voter barometers. Of those new supporters, 4.5 percent are voters who have changed parties and 2 percent are first-time voters and non-voters.

The Liberal Party has picked up an extra 2 percent in the same way, with 1.5 percent being voters who changed parties and 0.5 percent being first-time voters or nonvoters.

The Center Party is also up by 2 percent (1 percent having changed parties and 1 percent being first-time voters or nonvoters).

The Social Democratic increase since 1979 is given as 9 percent (5.5 percent being those who changed parties and 3.5 percent all others).

The VPK's increase is 1 percent (0.5 percent being those who changed parties and 0.5 percent all others).

The Environment Party shows an average increase of 5.5 percent (4 percent being those who changed parties and 1 percent all others [figures as published]).

Environment Party Supporters

For the entire period covered by the polls, the number of Environment Party supporters is said to have averaged 4.5 percent. The poll shows that 51 percent

of its supporters came from the nonsocialist parties, 27 percent from the socialist parties, and 19 percent from among the nonvoters and first-time voters.

Of the nonsocialist voters who now support the Environment Party, 33 percent are from the Center Party, 12 percent are from the Liberal Party, and 7 percent are from the Conservative Party.

Of its socialist supporters, 15 percent are from the Social Democratic Party and 12 percent are from the VPK.

Of the newly added voters, 17 percent are classified as nonvoters and 2 percent as first-time voters.

Party	Entire electorate	First-time voters	Nonvoters
Conservative Party	23.5	29.0	23.0
Liberal Party	6.0	0.0	6.5
Center Party	11.5	12.0	9.0
Christian Democratic Union	1.5	1.0	1.5
Social Democrats	48.0	49.0	43.0
VPK	4.0	3.0	3.5
Environment Party	4.0	4.0	9.5
All others	1.5	1.0	4.5

The table shows an average for voter barometer results during the period from the fall of 1979 to the spring of 1982. For the Social Democrats, for example, it shows an average of 48 percent, compared to 45.5 percent in the voter barometer for June. The figures show that the Conservatives are overrepresented among first-time voters, of whom 29 percent support the Conservatives, compared to 23.5 percent of the population as a whole. The Liberal Party, with 0 percent among first-time voters and 6 percent in the voter barometer, is very clearly underrepresented among the youngest voters. Among nonvoters, the Social Democrats are underrepresented as far as party preferences are concerned (43 percent, compared to 48 percent), while the Environment Party and other small parties not represented in Parliament are clearly overrepresented.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

SDP PRESENTS CAMPAIGN THEMES--Peace, work, Olof Palme, the Swedish flag, and, above all, social security--that is the message being presented to the voters by Social Democratic election posters. The posters were shown to the press on Monday--but they will not enter the battle until 20 August. There are 15 variations on the theme. "Vote with the Social Democrats" was created by the Are Corporation. Appearing in the right-hand corner of all the posters is the Social Democratic red rose. As for the rest of it, the messages are usually brief, examples being "The nonsocialists had their chance. They didn't do the job" or "Sweden will be made strong again. Out of the crisis." The last-named poster has a Swedish flag as its eye-catcher--the kind that is genuinely Swedish, with halyard and the wind in its folds. Like in Sorgarden, maybe. "Peace and work" are the most important aims of the Social Democrats, according to a big poster on which party chairman Olof Palme is shown smiling gently. He is not your ordinary poster material, of course. So why this time? [By Magdalena Ribbing] [Excerpt] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Aug 82 p 7] 11798

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PANEL EXAMINES TURKISH RELATIONS WITH GREECE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 10 Jul 82 p 13

[Panel discussion attended by Professor Haluk Ulman, Hasan Esat Isik and Hayrettin Erkmen; moderated by Taylan Sorgun: "Turkey's Stance Toward Greece"]

[Text] The Participants:

Professor Haluk Ulman was born in Uskudar in 1931. He is a graduate of the Galatasaray Lycée and the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He later served as a graduate assistant at the same faculty. He received his doctorate in 1961, became an assistant professor in 1965 and a full professor in 1971. He was involved in various research projects in the United States and France. Currently, he teaches political history and political sciences at the Istanbul Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences.

Hasan Esat Isik was born in Istanbul in 1916. He is a graduate of the Ankara School of Law. He was elected as a deputy in the National Assembly and later served as foreign minister and defense minister in various governments.

Hayrettin Erkmen was born in Giresun in 1916. He was elected to the National Assembly as a Democratic Party deputy in 1950. He served as labor and commerce minister. He was imprisoned in Yassiada after the 27 May 1960 revolution. In 1975, he was elected to the National Assembly again as a deputy from Giresun. He served as foreign minister in 1979. Currently, he is a member of faculty at the Istanbul Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences.

Taylan Sorgun: Turkish-Greek relations, which were in a state of stagnation for a brief period, are once again on the political agenda following statements by [Greek Prime Minister Andreas] Papandreou during his tours in Greece. Greece recently allocated a considerable portion of its budget to armaments, and, naturally, its policies must be carefully monitored. Political observers have predicted that Turkish-Greek relations, which, in general, have developed in a "nonpositive" direction, will once again deteriorate. This panel will discuss Turkish-Greek relations in a general outline. Our panel members, the Honorable Isik, the Honorable Erkmen and the Honorable Ulman will debate the issue. First, I invite the Honorable Isik to express his views on the issue.

Hasan Esat Isik: The subject of this panel discussion is most relevant for today. Because the Aegean problem and Turkish-Greek relations are issues which have a

direct bearing on Turkey and which may be resolved in one way or another depending on Turkey's stance. Turkish-Greek friendship has a certain place in Turkey's foreign policy. In fact, we can call that "Ataturk's legacy."

Ataturk chose to insure Turkey's sovereignty by cooperating with civilized countries rather than fighting. When he established good relations with Greece, Ataturk knew that countries which could not get along well with their neighbors could not allocate sufficient resources for their development.

Anyone who has had responsibilities in foreign policy has always attached great importance to friendship between Turkey and Greece. Despite that, however, as you mentioned earlier, we have found ourselves in an undesirable situation. Why has this happened? It is necessary to answer this question. That can be done in a number of steps.

After our war of liberation, Ataturk had the foresight--which must be expected from every head of state--not to use his rights as a victor and, instead, chose to establish friendly ties with Greece. This, naturally, made it easier for Greece to shed the humiliation of defeat. Furthermore, Turkey has always shown more understanding toward Greece than that shown by Greece toward Turkey. The most evident example of this is the fact that when, in those days, Greece raised its airspace to 10 miles, Turkey did not explicitly state that it did not recognize that act. More precisely, Turkey did not recognize that act, but did not feel the need to state that explicitly. Moreover, Greece has been mean with respect to the treatment of Turks living in Western Thrace as envisaged by treaties, while Turkey has shown exactly the opposite attitude toward Greeks living in this country.

In the second stage, we have the Dodecanese Islands incident. After World War II, Greece claimed the Dodecanese. That was natural, but there was something that was not natural: During the process of the transfer of the Dodecanese to Greece, Turkey exhibited a "tolerance which was beyond that expected by Greece" and did not feel the need to put forth any conditions with respect to these islands. This, naturally, brought about a significant change in the Turkish-Greek balance in the Aegean.

After Greece took possession of the Dodecanese, it discovered a new situation in Turkish-Greek relations: Turkey will not be too insistent on its rights in the Aegean. It is this perception that has made Greece act the way it is acting now. It is impossible to say that Turkey does not have its share of blame in this.

In Turkey's tolerance and good will toward Greece on the issues of 10-mile airspace and the Dodecanese, there was the factor of Italy which, at the time, was considered to be a threat in the Aegean. Turkey saw it in its interests to have a more powerful Greece in the Aegean in order to curb Italy's power. However, this must not mean that silence over the issue was justified. Before the Dodecanese passed into Greek sovereignty, Turkey was not threatened with being imprisoned in its own territorial waters by Greece.

Before I close this issue, I want to discuss one point over which I feel very emotional. Ataturk was the commander in chief of Turkish armies. He was born in

Thessaloniki, which is also the cradle of Turkey's 1908 freedom movement. Despite that, Ataturk did not insist even on Thessaloniki after the war. I feel moved by this great act, but I feel uncomfortable about the response this act has received from Greece. Perhaps I am too emotional, but I could not resist talking about this.

There are two important incidents in Turkish-Greek relations in the post-World War II period. The first one is concerned with the simultaneous membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO, and the other one involves the fact that Greece was made the center of the civil aviation system in the Aegean. This second incident has raised Greece's hopes as in the case of the Dodecanese incident. Following Turkey's membership in NATO, a strange situation developed: Turkey began thinking that the Turkish-Greek balance in the Aegean lost its importance. Actually, this is a gracious viewpoint, because the alliance is an important matter. But such a viewpoint is justified only when other members in the alliance also endorse that viewpoint.

Greece has not attached too much importance to the alliance and has instead tried to make sure that measures taken within the NATO framework strengthen its position in the Aegean vis-à-vis that of Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, has remained indifferent in the face of this attitude. For the other allies, the important issue is securing a common defense in the region. As a result of these attitudes toward Greece, it has become a custom to resolve Turkish-Greek disputes within NATO in favor of Greece and against the interests of Turkey. The peevish attitude of Greece and the sedate stance of Turkey have played important roles in this result. It is necessary to make Greece renounce this attitude. As long as Turkey and Greece take conflicting positions within the alliance, there will be uneasiness about Turkish-Greek relations as well as Turkey's ties with the West.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Isik, you said: "...make Greece renounce this attitude." How will this be done?

Hasan Esat Isik: Naturally, this must first be tried in a friendly manner. But if that does not work, then Greece must be made to understand through "certain stances." Let me give an example. This was an experience we had when the Democratic Party was in power. There was a time in Turkey's history when both the major political parties thought: "There is no Cyprus problem for Turkey." Then, Greece, which had taken possession of the 12 Dodecanese islands, started asking why it should not have Cyprus, the 13th island. In response, the Turkish government at the time said: "We cannot abandon our rights in Cyprus." The government also showed that it was prepared to back its words with action. As a result, Greece as well as allies which had endorsed the annexation of Cyprus by Greece changed their stance and the Zurich agreements were signed and even Makarios was forced to put his signature on them. In view of its braking effect on Greece's ambitions this move was seen as a factor which could improve Turkish-Greek relations, but the situation returned to its original state when Turkey once again took a position of indifference later on.

During the latest Bonn summit, Papandreu was able to say: "We have at last made our allies accept our rights in the Aegean." This is impossible to understand. Greece has been taking all problems to all forums of negotiations. For example,

the disarmament of the Dodecanese is a commitment that Greece has undertaken not only with respect to Turkey, but also with respect to all its other allies. Despite that, the islands have been armed. Whenever faced with issues brought forth by Greece in international forums, Turkey must be able to say: "Greece must first account for the arming of the Dodecanese."

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Erkmen, the Honorable Isik gave an overview of the development of Turkish-Greek relations over the years. He also said that Turkey has been compromising and silent with respect to Turkish-Greek relations, that Greece has benefited from this stance of Turkey's and that Turkey has been unable to defend its interests in the Aegean. What are your views on these issues?

Hayrettin Erkmen: Turkish-Greek relations have been developing in the same manner you have pointed out; there have been no changes. As will be recalled, we discussed this issue in a previous panel conversation. If we want to consider the changes since then, we have to look at the following milestones: The sea conference, the 12-mile territorial water issue, the NATO summit conference, the NATO military maneuvers and NATO Commander Barnard Rogers' visit to Turkey.

The points over which the Honorable Isik was critical during his overview of diplomatic history are points with which everybody will agree, with, perhaps, some difference of interpretation and emphasis. Greece is a country which broke off from the Ottoman Empire with great peevishness and clamor. There, it had the support of other nations.

Greece has had faults from the moment of its inception, and it will not change its attitude. It is necessary to talk with resolve, to take a clear stance and to back words with action to make Greece change its attitude. I agree with the Honorable Isik in that respect. The example he gave is a correct example. I lived through that experience. It is true that the factor which forced Greece to negotiate and eventually sign the London and Zurich agreements was the determined stance of the Turkish government. This stance also had the strong support of the people. While Greece was forced to sign these agreements as a result of Turkey's determined stand, this result perhaps also paved the way for Karamanlis' defeat in the elections and his eventual expatriation. Following these events, a process of rapprochement was initiated between Turkey and Greece. Doors were opened to friendly relations between the Menderes and Karamanlis governments. But this process came to an end as a result of domestic political changes in Turkey as well as Greece.

Why has Turkey been compromising toward Greece? This is a fact, and it cannot be denied. But I must state that this situation must change at some point.

Let us take the issue of the Dodecanese and the Aegean islands. Sovereignty over the Aegean islands did not change hands by the Lausanne Treaty. Because the underlying philosophy in that case was that Greeks constituted the majority of the population of those islands and that sovereignty over the islands had changed hands before the war between Turkey and Greece. But the treaty turned Western Thrace over to Greece, even though it was within the borders of the Ottoman Empire before the war.

I look for good will in the attitudes of past and present Turkish governments toward Greece, and I see that as a continuation of the step taken by Ataturk to foster good relations. Ataturk acted sincerely and generously because he wanted to resolve the problems with Greece over the long run and in a broad framework and because he wanted to live with Greece without arms. But every generosity has, of course, its limits. A line must be drawn somewhere so that giving will not become a custom.

So far, compromises have been made which have rendered existing problems unsolvable. The continental shelf problem and the threat of being imprisoned in the Aegean are direct results of allowing Greece to take over the Dodecanese. The fact that we are leaving our kinsmen in Western Thrace to their terrible fate is the direct result of our abandoning Western Thrace to Greece.

How do we see the issues now? At the sea conference, Greece has reiterated its intention to raise its territorial water limits to 12 miles. I do not know what Papandreu said during the NATO summit, but it is a fact that the Greeks are in the habit of appearing as having said what they have not said. In my opinion, by raising old issues, Papandreu is trying to use them as an ignition device to seek a solution to current problems.

If we look at the situation after the NATO summit, we must ask why Barnard Rogers visited Turkey. Rogers' visit to Turkey is normal. But can his visit to Turkey right after the summit be interpreted in another way? Official statements do not permit such an interpretation. One possibility that comes to mind is that in view of Papandreu's arguments on whether the provisional agreement known as the "Rogers Plan" is in force, Rogers came to Turkey to preclude the emergence of any possible conflicts over this issue.

Taylan Sorgun: What are your views concerning this plan?

Hayrettin Erkmen: In reality, we do not have a system which would justify the use of the term "plan." Turkey has stated its position with respect to Greece's return to NATO's military wing as follows: "Yes to Greece's entry to NATO's military wing. But no to the return to the pre-1974 conditions." Those conditions meant that Greece would consider the FIR [flight information region] as an area under its own sovereignty and, consequently, the Aegean as its own sphere of responsibility. The Aegean, with its airspace and sea lanes, is a common area of defense for NATO. Therefore, its control must be defined on the basis of the sovereignty rights of both Turkey and Greece. When the two sides could not agree on a common position, various proposals were made to both sides simply in order to find a military solution, and an agreement was eventually reached within the framework of these proposals. According to the agreement, both sides provisionally abandoned their claims. Thus a provisional agreement was reached, and Greece was able to enter NATO's military wing. But the plan is not binding in any way.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Ulman, now I request your views on these issues.

Haluk Ulman: Turkish-Greek relations must be discussed within a general framework as we are doing in this panel discussion; the issue must not be looked at from

a standpoint of daily events. Turkish-Greek relations have generally been characterized by conflict except a few short periods of friendship, which coincide with times when we faced common enemies.

In studying relations between Turkey and Greece two important points must not be underestimated. One of them concerns the feelings and the attitudes of the Turkish and Greek nations toward each other beyond the stance of their governments. Here the following point must not be forgotten: From the time the Greek peninsula and the Balkans came under Ottoman sovereignty until Greece's independence, the Turkish and Greek communities lived intermingled with each other. Since the two communities came from different cultural and religious backgrounds they did not mix as well as is commonly perceived. Both communities have always harbored feelings of enmity toward each other. This has continued for a long time. The Turkish and Greek communities have historically harbored feelings of mistrust and conflict against each other. The second important point is that the two nations have gained their independence by fighting against each other. This has deepened the mistrust between the two nations and, in addition, has raised numerous territorial and population problems.

In Lausanne, it was thought that an equilibrium was found on the issues of territory and population. But this equilibrium has not withstood the test of time and has changed as a result of international developments. The issue of the Dodecanese islands is the most important issue that has upset this equilibrium. This issue radically changed the Mediterranean balance that was established by the Lausanne Treaty. The second important change came with Cyprus. As is known, Cyprus was abandoned to Britain. When, within the course of international developments, Cyprus achieved its independence under the domination of the Greek Cypriot community, the balance established in Lausanne was again significantly changed.

It will be observed that the balance established in Lausanne was upset as a result of international developments and that further international developments brought about new disputes.

Turkey has made mistakes with respect to its relations with Greece, but what is more important, it has been late in realizing its rights over the Aegean. This is because--this might seem surprising--Turkey is not maritime power. It is a land power. Apart from the brief Ottoman domination of the Mediterranean during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent and a few of his successors, the Ottoman Empire did not exist as a maritime power. Even in the heyday of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman sea trade in the Mediterranean and the Aegean was carried out by Greeks sailing in ships flying the Ottoman flag. The Greeks have a maritime tradition, and they are clinging to it. Turkey learned the importance of the sea slowly and made numerous mistakes in the process. Some of these mistakes resulted from good will; others were forced by technical impossibilities. Turkey turned over the civil aviation control of the Aegean airspace in order to save itself the inconvenience.

As for the issue of the Dodecanese, those islands were offered to Turkey during World War II. But, President Inonu wisely rejected the offer on grounds that accepting the offer might have adverse effects on Turkey's foreign policy and the

course of the war. And after the war, we were not in a position to have any say over the Dodecanese.

The continental shelf issue has emerged only recently. By the time we became aware of this issue, Greece had already established superiority in the Aegean. Greece also seems to be more adept than ourselves in defending its viewpoint on the outstanding issues in international forums. Here, there are two important factors. One is the fact that Greece is a Christian country and the other one is that the Greeks have powerful lobbies in foreign countries.

What must be done now? This is something that is not dependent on our unilateral attitude. Whether they like it or not, Turkey and Greece have to accept the fact that they have to live side by side and that the disputes must be resolved peacefully. But, this is something that can be done by reviewing all links between Turkey and Greece. Readiness to undertake such a review is an important matter. It will be easier for Turkey to undertake such a review. It is not easy for Greece to dissociate itself from the West. If Turkey does that, it is possible for it to find new directions because of its historical traditions. I am not arguing that that would be a right move; I am just mentioning it as a possibility.

How will an agreement be reached through negotiations? This is possible only when you have responsible people sitting across from the table. But if you have politicians like Papandreu who want to base the perpetuation of their power on the Turkish-Greek dispute, this issue cannot be resolved.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Ulman, you talked about negotiations between the two sides. According to what was said here, Greece has already taken whatever it wants; there is nothing more it can take in the Aegean. Why would Greece agree to sit at the negotiating table?

Haluk Ulman: Greece must come to the negotiating table not with the purpose of giving or taking something, but in order to determine the future status of the Aegean. Unless this is done, Greece has no right to perpetuate a de facto situation in the Aegean which it has achieved through historical and chancy developments. Furthermore, no Turkish administration will ever accept such a situation.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Ulman, you also talked about the power of the Greek lobby in foreign countries. Let me ask you this: How will the resignation of the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who appeared to be a pro-Turkish official, affect Turkish-Greek relations "on the surface"?

Haluk Ulman: I do not think it will have any effect. If the American policymakers are genuinely concerned with the common defense of the West, they must have made a general assessment about Turkey's place in that defense. Today, Turkey has a very important place in President Reagan's policy of strength.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Erkmen, the Honorable Ulman said a while ago that Turkey could act more comfortably than Greece if dissociation from the West ever became an issue.

Haluk Ulman: There, I tried to be very careful in choosing my words. I meant that Turkey has more facility than Greece to do something like that. I did not mention it as something that must be done.

Hayrettin Erkmen: It is not possible to imagine that Turkey would break its ties with the West over its disputes with Greece. In fact, our colleague, Ulman, did not say that. Of course, Greece has closer ties with the West because of factors like religion, family ties etcetera. But this does not mean that they have nowhere else to go while we can turn to others. It is a fact, however, that Turkey and Greece have to live side by side, and Greece must understand this. As for the issue of what we must do if they do not understand this fact, we must try to explain this fact by "action." Turkey has always resolved its problems with Greece while the West sided with Greece. Turkey must show the determination not to let its rights to be violated and not to retreat even a single step.

For example, Turkey must always insist on the discussion of the disarmament of the Aegean islands. It must do this persistently and with patience. We must even risk armed conflict if that is the price we have to pay for it. Greece's intention to raise its territorial waters limit to 12 miles must be rejected and this position must be maintained no matter what the results may be. No matter who acts against Turkey, he must be stopped. The same stance must be taken over the airspace issue.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Ulman, when you said "review all issues," you had the same things in mind as the Honorable Erkmen.

Haluk Ulman: Yes. The Aegean was included in "all issues."

Hayrettin Erkmen: The attitude of the United States toward Turkey consists of two factors: Turkish-American relations and Greek-American relations. The United States cannot easily let go of its bases in Greece. Perhaps, Haig was more sympathetic toward us as a person who had personal friendships in Turkey. He viewed us with sympathy. But these are not determinant factors; they only provide easement in negotiations.

Hasan Esat Isik: I would like to clarify some of the points the Honorable Ulman brought up in accordance with my views. One of them is the issue of mistrust between the Turkish and Greek communities. In my opinion, the issue is as follows: "The Turkish and Greek communities have felt uneasy about living under the yoke of each other." But saying that "they feel hostile against each other" would be going a little too far. The uneasiness between Turkey and Greece is the result of the Greek politicians' desire to gain recognition rather than the nature of the two communities.

It is hard to disagree with the view that Turkey is a land power and that it has neglected the seas. Although the Ottoman Empire could afford to neglect the Aegean, that is no longer true for the Turkish Republic. We have no right to neglect today what we have neglected in the past. Here, I would like to quote Ataturk on naval power: "The purpose of naval power is to protect Turkey's sons from fighting a war on their own land." A nation that owns Anatolia cannot defend that piece of land by retreating into the hinterland. To insure the security of Anatolia, we must control the Aegean till about half way across it. Greece may claim

sovereignty over the Aegean islands, but we have Anatolia, and its security depends on drawing a line in the Aegean at an adequate distance from our shores.

Ismet Inonu displayed great insight by rejecting the offer on the Dodecanese. However, if Turkey had acted more courageously in dealing with its allies in connection with the determination of the future of the Dodecanese, it could have acquired certain rights over these islands. Turkey did not even demand that the "Turks living on the Dodecanese be given the same rights as those living in Western Thrace." This must be well understood.

Today, the West has a certain admiration toward Greece as a consequence of the ancient Greek civilization as well as other factors. But Western countries and giants like the United States cannot decide on the direction of their foreign policy on the basis of such emotional factors. If Turkey tells its allies that "they cannot take sides between Turkey and Greece" and that "they must maintain an equal distance between the two countries," then our Western allies will have no difficulty in understanding it. One example of this is the Cyprus issue, which was mentioned earlier.

Greece has presented the FIR not as an international region, but as an area under its own sovereignty. It has even gone further by trying to bring our military planes within the jurisdiction of the rules governing the flight of civilian aircraft. All Greece wants is to be the "sovereign" country in the Aegean. If it cannot do that, it wants to be the power which "has the final say" in the Aegean. As long as Greece is not forced to abandon this goal, all our efforts will be in vain. Turkey's good will is misinterpreted in foreign circles; they see that stance as an effort to secure military and economic aid. We must also not forget that if we try to get everything done by good will, one day that will be interpreted as appeasement. Turkey still has the spirit of the National Struggle. Part of that spirit is a fundamental principle: "You cannot solve your troubles by making compromises." Problems are solved by going against them head on. In order to solve present problems, solutions must not be chosen such that future generations will suffer greater problems. Here, I would like to quote Ataturk again. He said: "I am neither a spoiler of peace, nor do I have any ambitions to add new territories to my country. But I have one habit that I cannot give up: I will insist on the rights given to me by treaties." Greece's attitude and our stance against it contravenes these principles.

As for the Rogers Plan, I think that that is a technical agreement. It is a document which proposes ways to insure the security of a certain region of NATO primarily in peacetime. But the Rogers Plan has been transformed into a political document because of the Turkish-Greek dispute, and it has been endorsed only after a number of changes were made. Barnard Rogers has virtually become a private sponsor of the plan. Even during NATO maneuvers, Greece cannot tolerate the fact that its airspace limit is considered to be 6 miles. Despite that, Turkey gives the impression that it might accept a revision of the plan. This is very dangerous for Turkey.

I would like to talk briefly about the special nature of Haig. As a result of our bashfulness, we have never been able to talk to our friends about the Turkish-Greek dispute. However, because of Haig's sincerity, this issue was

explained to him very comfortably. In fact, Haig proposed a plan which went beyond the Rogers Plan and which extended Turkey's rights over the Aegean halfway across that sea. This made Greece very angry. That is Haig's importance for Turkey.

After the Bonn summit, Papandreou said: "If Turkey wants to talk to me, then, for some time, it must respect the rights I have claimed for myself in the Aegean." He also says that he has nothing to discuss over the Aegean. If, despite all that, we get the impression that a dialog is emerging, we will be encouraging Greece in what it wants to do.

Taylan Sorgun: Honorable Erkmen, the Dodecanese were frequently mentioned during the conversation. What are your views on this issue?

Hayrettin Erkmen: It is hard to recall this issue from the pages of history and to put it on the negotiating table. But there is one point which makes us uneasy. The fact that Greece has been the only country benefiting from the change of sovereignty over the Dodecanese has deprived Turkey from the Mediterranean. Should we have acted as we did at the time? I do not want to argue about that; history will decide on that issue. However, the fact that the Turkish leaders of the time did not show a realistic approach to the issue, the fact that they did not demand certain rights for Turkey, the fact that they appeared disinterested about the transfer of the islands as a third country in order not to look sympathetic toward Germany and the fact that they took a deliberately passive stance on the issue deprived Turkey completely and permanently from any claims in this area. In my opinion, that was a historical opportunity lost.

Taylan Sorgun: The panelists agreed during this session that Turkey has not been able to pursue a determined and consistent policy regarding Turkish-Greek relations over the course of history. While there was agreement over the importance of the Dodecanese issue for Turkey, differences of opinion emerged over Turkey's stance at the time when the Dodecanese were handed over to Greece. Another point over which there was difference of opinion concerned the manner in which the Turkish and Greek communities perceive each other. There was agreement over the view that Greece and Turkey's other allies will retreat if Turkey displays a determined stance. It was also determined that problems with Greece within NATO were always resolved in favor of Greece and that this was because of Turkey's attitude.

9588

CSO: 4654/391

WEAPONRY, ARMOR OF EIGHT AMX-10 TANK MODELS DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Jan-Feb 82 pp 25-26

[Article: "The AMX-10 As 'A Diversified Frame'"]

[Text] Having played a role of forerunner in the 1950's by putting into service the VTT AMX-13 [all-purpose AMX-13], an armored troop transport carrier which is completely sealed, the French Army owed it to itself to find a successor to this vehicle. Beginning in 1965 the imperatives of mobility, firepower, and protection led to the planning of a new attack vehicle capable of transporting an infantry combat group.

The AMX-10 was born out of this program. It was studied by the AMX/APX Armaments Corporation, and then industrialized and serially produced since 1973 by the Roanne [Mechanical] Construction Plant (ARE).

Around the AMX-10P (P standing for personnel) with which the French Army's mechanized and armored units as well as those of several other countries are equipped, a large number of versions have been developed and analyzed, all of them similar in terms of the hull and mechanical characteristics.

This extensive standardization, which offers obvious advantages, has been made possible by the general design of the AMX-10's frame characterized as follows:

- Its large usable space;
- The greater free surface area making variations in weaponry possible;
- Easy access through the rear vertical side.

The AMX-10's chassis, built of mechanically-welded aluminum panels, is divided into two major components:

- In front, the stationary equipment and instrumentation (engine and control panel);
- At the rear, an extensive regular-shaped surface providing excellent seating possibilities, occupied (depending on the particular version of

the AMX-10) by complementary operating or gunnery personnel (the turret pit, ammunition, and so on).

The mechanical systems of transmission and the fuel tanks are housed in the sides, which makes it possible to have available a large usable space, easy to lay out.

The AMX-10's chassis, resistant to gas and water, can provide (optionally) NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] protection and endows it with amphibious capability. Accordingly, all versions in the AMX-10 series may be readied for combat in a contaminated environment and provide great aquatic maneuverability. These vehicles are capable of crossing bodies of water by their own means without needing fording facilities to be provided by the Army Corps of Engineers. This characteristic gives the AMX-10 complete independence and remarkable effectiveness.

The natural qualities of mobility of the AMX-10 and the compactness of its low-slung profile contribute to its protection. Still, the armor of its frame and the judicious configuration of the thickness and angles of the plates constitute effective protection against shell bursts and the projectiles of infantry weapons.

Serially produced since 1973, the AMX-10 has been the subject of constant improvements and this series of vehicles is in constant evolution on two levels:

--On the technical level, the study offices continue to work on further improvements (more flexible transmissions, more powerful engines, and so on);

--On the operational level new versions are now in process of development such as the "Ravitailleur," linked to the use of the self-propelled 135-GCT gun and the AMX-10 TMC-81, which carries a mortar-gun in its turret.

The AMX-10 series of vehicles thus represents for an entire army wishing to modernize a proposal that is all the more attractive as this array of sturdy and reliable equipment covers a very broad range of uses, from such utility vehicles as the 10-ECH (for repairs) to such combat vehicles as the PAC-90 and the antitank HOT and including command or fire guidance types.

There are few examples--and none of them is recent at any rate--of such diversification of use with a single hull as base.

[Characteristics of the AMX-10]

Weight:

For transport	11.7 tons
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For combat	14.2 tons
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Dimensions:

Length [of hull] 5.778 meters

Width 2.780 meters

Height 2.570 meters

Ground clearance 0.450 meter

Speed:

Maximum road speed 65 km/hr

Average road speed 50 km/hr

Average speed on terrain 30-40 km/hr

Speed on water without hydrojets 1.80 meters/second

Speed on water with hydrojets 2.20 meters/second

Road range without refueling 600 km

Autonomy in combat (on a NATO-type "war" mission) 24 hours

Fording capability:

Gradient 60%

Side slope 30%

Trench with unobstructed sides 1.60 meters

Vertical obstacle 0.70 meter

**Fording of watercourse: Propulsion by tracks
(hydrojets proposed as an option).**

Major Versions of the AMX-10 Vehicle and Their Missions

1. AMX-10P: Basic version in the series of AMX-10 vehicles. This is an infantry combat armored vehicle that is entirely sealed. It constitutes the prototype vehicle of a modern mechanized infantry. This version carries a combat group of nine soldiers in addition to the driver and the gunner.

2. AMX 10-PC: This is a command vehicle which has the capability, while in motion or stationary, to establish contact with higher and subordinate levels of command, observe the terrain and do mapping work. It has a crew of six men. This version can be equipped with a variable band radio when needed (including from two to four radio units).

3. AMX-10 TM: This version provides firepower support for troops with a 120-millimeter mortar and also enjoys mobility and speed while preparing to fire. It can haul a mortar and carry the complete mortar-firing crew (5 men) and 60 rounds of ammunition.
4. AMX-10 PAC-90: Thanks to its mobility and the power of its armament, this version can carry out antitank, support or reconnaissance missions. It has a crew of seven men, including a four-man defense group. It can carry 30 rounds of 90-millimeter shells and 3,200 rounds of 7.62 millimeter and 1,000 rounds of 12.7-millimenter [machinegun] ammunition.
5. AMX-10 TMC-81: This version is a mechanized infantry fire support vehicle. It carries a crew of seven men. Also, 118 rounds of ammunition, including 58 in its turret. This vehicle represents the latest version in the AMX-10 series.
6. AMX-10 HOT: This is a long-range antitank combat vehicle equipped with a HOT missile firing turret. It is capable of destroying the best protected battle tanks. It carries a 6-man crew, 4 missiles in its turret, and an additional 14 in its hull.
7. AMX-10 SAO: Equipped with a gunnery observation tower, this version makes possible advanced artillery observation as well as firing guidance of an armored unit. It has a crew of five men. Its special equipment includes a binocular viewer, a laser-telemeter, an autonomous range finder and localizer, and a capability to hook into the ATILA network.
8. AMX-10 RATAc: Designed for surveillance work in the theater of operations and for radar pursuit of enemy targets to help artillery units, this version is hooked into the ATILA network or operates autonomously. It carries a crew of five men.

2662.
CSO: 3100/785

ARMED FORCES FUEL SERVICE GIVES TECHNICAL, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Mar-Apr 82 pp 21-24

[Article by Gen Gilbert Borde, engineer, central chief of the fuel service, and chief engineer Maurice Durand, director of the central fuels office, reprinted from the periodical, DEFENSE: "The Armed Forces Fuel Service"]

[Text] The Armed Forces Fuel Service (SEA) is charged with supplying fuels and lubricants to all units of the armed forces, everywhere, in peacetime as well as in wartime, with the exception of the craft of the National Navy which are fueled in the ports through the services of the Commissariat of the Navy. It could be noted, however, that the SEA supplies all the products used in common by the National Navy [and other armed forces] (that is, fuels and lubricants for its ground vehicles) as well as aviation products for the naval air arm at whose airfields SEA fuel tanks are installed, as they are at the principal bases of the Air Force and ALAT [Ground Forces Tactical Air Support].

This universal and permanent mission fulfilled by the SEA in the oil sector on the account of the armed forces has three principal aspects, each distinct yet complementary to one another, namely:

--A purely technical mission, with advanced technology, whose goal is to identify, in cooperation with the General Delegation for Armament and the major central general staffs, the oil products and materials needed by the armed forces.

--A strictly logistical mission whose purpose is to supply, store and distribute to the armed forces those fuels and lubricants which they need, both under peacetime conditions and under wartime conditions at combat sites.

--A special mission benefiting the ground forces consisting of supplying, managing and maintaining for account of this army the oil materials and equipment that it needs. This mission is analogous to that of a supply service.

Alongside the major missions indicated above we can also mention three secondary but nevertheless important missions:

- To advise the major military commands on oil resources and possibly represent these commands in dealing with national or inter-Allied organs.
- To participate directly in the management of the inter-Allied oil pipeline network.
- To provide staff for the "fuel" units of the ground forces and instruct specialized oil personnel from this armed service.

In the last analysis the Armed Forces Fuel Service is the supplier of fuels and lubricants to the armed forces and the military technical expert for oil problems. Having an interservice mission, it falls under the jurisdiction of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, just like the Health Service.

The Means

The SEA's organization includes the following:

- At the level of the Ministry of Armed Forces, the Central Directorate of Fuels of the Armed Forces, which directs and coordinates the operations of the service.
- Central organs charged with fulfilling certain missions in the interest of the service as a whole (Central Fuels Organization, Fuel Operations School, Central Fuels Laboratory, Fuels Data-Processing Service).
- Regional directorates set up at the level of the military regions. The regional director of fuels falls directly under the jurisdiction of the central fuels director and is obviously not subordinated to the general commanding the military region (in the ground forces). As regards the supply of fuels to forces at the regional level, relations between the regional director of fuels and the general officers commanding the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Gendarmerie, respectively, are at the same level.

Organization

The means available to the Fuel Service to accomplish its missions are those of an oil company with a military purpose and include two parts: The SEA "industrial" service and the SEA acting in direct support of the forces.

The SEA Industrial Service

The operation of this part of the SEA greatly resembles that of a civilian oil company in its mode of management and its financial operation but is different in its technology and the means it uses. For its financial operations the SEA has available an annex budget that it manages itself. This gives it great flexibility as well as major independence vis-a-vis each of the three armed services--land, sea, and air--under the orders of the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

Management is provided by military staff (military engineers, officers of the technical unit, noncommissioned officers), using civilian operating personnel (blue-collar and office workers).

To stock fuels, the SEA has at its disposal a broad geographic establishment made up of storage facilities built after World War II on the basis of a plan aimed at reducing the vulnerability of stocks, especially through dispersal of storage tanks and burying them below ground. The result is that the infrastructure of the SEA is incomparably less vulnerable than the corresponding civilian installations but much more expensive and built with a very different construction technique.

The means of transportation, namely, the stock of tank trucks, are organized in such a way that in peacetime the use of complementary civilian resources may be limited to a level making it possible to achieve maximum economic profitability from the military rolling stock (coverage of the points of activity, unprofitable isolated connections) while in times of crisis or wartime the intensive use of the SEA's inventory of transportation means (together with reinforcements in military drivers) should make it possible to easily meet all military needs in fuels.

Finally, care should be taken not to omit, in the matter of transportation capabilities, the fact that a portion of the oil pipeline network of common defense in France is operated by personnel of the Armed Forces Fuel Service.

The SEA in Direct Support of the Forces

From the rear reserves maintained in the stationary, so-called "industrial," infrastructure of the SEA, the forces are supplied by organs of the SEA more directly integrated into the armed forces.

--For the Air Force the problem is relatively simple, this service being practically in a state of permanent mobilization. Consequently, even in peacetime, SEA depots are built at air bases. Each of these depots supplies fuel to aircraft with the help of equipment (fuel trucks or hydrant systems). In wartime, from the first alert, this organ of the SEA (including equipment and personnel) is integrated into an air force unit created on the spot under the orders of an Air Force officer. This unit can then be reinforced and possibly called upon to move elsewhere.

--For the Army the problem is greater because there is a major discontinuity in functions between peacetime and wartime and in wartime the problems of providing supplies during operations are complex: Dispersal of the units, tactical mobility, the need for transportation and distribution resources to operate in all kinds of terrain, combat conditions of forces on contact, and so on. The quantities involved, incidentally, are very sizable. Gen Omar Bradley used to say that where 1 ton of food is required 6 tons of fuel are necessary--and that was back in 1944.

The daily consumption of an army corps now is approximately 2,300 cubic meters of fuel. Now, this unit could be deployed along a line 50 to 100 km long and

over a depth of 50 km, and the problems raised in supplying it can easily be imagined. That is why the Armed Forces Fuel Service has units available, namely, the Mixed Fuel Companies, diversified units equipped with means of transport for all roads or terrains and modern storage using flexible plastic reservoirs, rapid servicing systems making it possible to fuel vehicles directly under combat conditions or to fill gasoline cans placed in reserve.

These companies are typically composed of the following sections:

- Command section;
- Transportation section;
- Administration or warehousing section;
- Technical section.

The number and quality of these sections are adapted to the company's missions. This is a very flexible arrangement. The number of personnel used in wartime by the Armed Forces Fuel Service is about 11,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, and rank and file (including in this number civilian personnel who remain at their posts in the infrastructure).

For an Overseas Role

The description of the operation of the Armed Forces Fuel Service would be incomplete if we did not mention its important role in the overseas territories, even in peacetime.

Government policy mandates the defense of France's national interest, even the protection of French citizens, beyond France's borders, in most cases overseas, in peacetime. Tactical missions as well as simple missions maintaining the French presence overseas call in the first place for the control of fuel supplies.

Such action evidences itself in different ways:

- Construction of military fuel reserves at the large strategic airports overseas to insure the maintenance of links with metropolitan France.
- Support of direct military action in the field.
- General studies concerning the resources and supplies of oil products in certain areas of the world.

To accomplish this, the SEA alone has the means adapted to these overseas missions:

- Special equipment, transportable by air and thus very light, such as flexible vats, oil equipment in aluminum alloys, equipment that can be

dropped by parachute, even dropped in free fall, and equipment resistant to tropical climates.

--Personnel who are immediately available and capable of putting abandoned or partially destroyed local installations back into service, able to undertake oil construction projects when no local enterprise is available to do the job.

--Staff capable of undertaking economic studies in a given political context, of finding resources by using the international civilian oil network on a priority basis and then possibly planning complementary field installations when needed.

Summary

This is the outline of the Armed Forces Fuel Service as it now appears with its principal characteristics, namely:

--Its interservice character, permanent and universal in the oil sector.

--Its industrial operation for the "rear" section and its operational integration into the armed forces "up front."

--Its technical competence in the field of military products and oil equipment.

Some Comments

We are now witnessing a twofold phenomenon:

--Rapid growth in the mechanization of our armed forces and an increase in the performance characteristics of military equipment, developing needs in fuels in that respect.

--On the international level, the depletion of oil, a commodity which has never been so appropriately dubbed "black gold" as today.

So long as a technological revolution, now unforeseen, does not make it possible to replace hydrocarbon-based fuels and supply much high-yield fuel to vehicles with the help of very few facilities (calling for limited storage capacity), the problem will grow in importance for the armed forces. The degree of resistance of the armed forces in the future will to a large extent reside in the durability of their fuel reserves.

Accordingly, one can imagine that a preliminary stage of the battle with conventional weapons will consist of depriving the adversary of his fuel resources, as has already happened in previous conflicts but which henceforth will have magnified consequences because of the high degree of mechanization of modern weapons.

The existence of an organ such as the Armed Forces Fuel Service, distributing fuel stocks, well protected and available at any moment, will thus become increasingly indispensable to the armed forces.

For the French armed forces, the Armed Forces Fuel Service as it is now constituted meets this need and under conditions of very significant industrial profitability at that.

Table 1. Industrial Survey of the Armed Forces Fuel Service in 1981

Principal activity	Distribution: --1,481,000 cubic meters of fuels and combustibles; --10,700 cubic meters/tons of oils and ingredients; 1.9% of the civilian market; Production: 8,000 cubic meters of ground-use oil.										
Personnel	Officers: 236 (including 30 serving in the oil pipeline units and divisions). Noncommissioned officers: 188 (including 32 on the staff of the oil pipeline divisions). Civilian office workers and blue-collar workers: 1,791.										
Equipment	--Over 100 depots, including 37 at bases (Air Force bases, ALAT bases, naval air arm bases). --600,000 cubic meters of its own storage facilities. --Laboratories, central store and workship, data-processing service, schools... --1,500 vehicles, including 600 tanker trucks and supply trucks and 400 railroad tank cars.										
Budget	5,109 million francs, used as follows: <table><tbody><tr><td>Purchase of products</td><td>71.0%</td></tr><tr><td>Dues and taxes</td><td>17.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Remunerations and social benefits</td><td>5.7%</td></tr><tr><td>Investments</td><td>1.5%</td></tr><tr><td>Miscellaneous, including depreciation</td><td>4.3%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Purchase of products	71.0%	Dues and taxes	17.5%	Remunerations and social benefits	5.7%	Investments	1.5%	Miscellaneous, including depreciation	4.3%
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2662
CSO: 3100/785

MILITARY

FRANCE

MARINE, PARACHUTIST EXERCISES IN BRETAGNE, NORD COTENTIN

[Paris COLS BLEUS in French 5 Jun 82 p 18]

[Text] Commanded by CV [Captain] Beraud, the amphibious strike force from Lorient, made a beacon call in the outer roads on the occasion of the "Archipel 82" exercise which then took place on the south coast of Brittany. Three vessels had taken on board four combat companies of the 1st Marine Infantry Regiment based at Granville and commanded by Colonel Pintoux. The "Bidassoa" successfully tested one of the three roll-on-roll-off bridges of the commercial port, taking a complete company on board. The TCD [LCT-landing craft tanks] "Orage" and "Ouragan" lowered their "Otaries" (equipment transport barges) into the water; they made several round-trips between the slip on the beach of Cherbourg and the loading platforms of the two big amphibious vessels with the rest of the motorized equipment of the 1st RIMA [Marine Infantry Regiment], whose command element was transported with several "sticks" from the CIN "Querqueville" by three Super-Frelon from Lanveoc, put on board for the duration of the exercise.

The "Gyrenes" spent more than 24 hours on board the vessels of the amphibious force before debarking with their 60 vehicles on the beaches of Combrif-Sainte-Marie.

North Cotentin was supposed to defend itself against the invaders of the "Yellow" party on the occasion of the exercise "Ecouves 82" which involved some 10,000 men, including 1,000 reservists at various points throughout the 3rd Military Region in the context of training for the operational defense of the territory. The high point of these big maneuvers was a drop of parachutists and dummies in the region of La Haye-du-Puits and Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte. The commandos then tried to seize the signal station of Saint-Vaast-la-Hougue, which was defended by the reservists from the Navy Defense Unit and the Protection Company of the Cherbourg arsenal.

However, for the recalled reservists of the navy units, the exercise began on the dunes of Biville with a complete refresher course extending from radio instruction to the various forms of firing. Then came the transfer of the 106th Navy Unit to the fort of la Hougue, a "sensitive point" which the "Green" side was supposed to defend at any cost to protect the permanent signal station (restored since 1981) and the radar of the mobile signal station (put in place for this particular purpose).

5058

CSO: 3110/789

MILITARY

FRANCE

LOCATION, TRAINING OF 2ND FOREIGN INFANTRY REGIMENT

Supplies to CAR

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 14

[Text] Having left on 25 February 1982 from the Bartia-Poretta airport in a DC-8 aircraft belonging to COTAM [Military Air Transport Command], the CEA [Scouting and Support Company] was scheduled to arrive on 26 February, following a night spent in the capital of the Central African Republic, at the Leclerc camp in Bouar. A total of 122 men making up the group took with them nearly 17 tons of equipment.

Once on location, the unit went to work in short order to give the Leclerc camp the definitive glitter of a Foreign Legion facility. And this without relinquishing the principal activities of technical instruction and maintenance of equipment, since a week after its arrival the group demonstrated, on the detachment's firing range located some 40 km north of Bouar, its capability of intervention and support.

It did so perfectly, placing the mortar shells where the liaison and observation unit wanted them. For its part, the SADAA [Antiair self-Defense Section], with the ground-level firing of its 20-millimeter guns, proved that it was up to par. The Milan [missile] section executed combat sweeps with live ammunition.

Taking advantage of the lessons already learned in Corte and Bouar, the CEA carried off its initial visit in the brush successfully and came back a week later confident in its future, its personnel and its equipment.

For 4 months in the heart of Africa, and after 2 years of existence, the CEA will acquire the specific skills of overseas intervention and prove that it is possible to adapt the Foreign Legion to act in all places and in all environments.

Helicopter Combat Training

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 18

[Text] Specialized for a few months now in helicopter-borne combat, the 7th Company made a point of proving to General Lardry that it was ready to accomplish all of the missions entrusted to it.

Having landed a few hundred meters from the Montlaur citadel, the company was to seize a locality of 2,000 inhabitants (represented by the district) in the face of an enemy who had a chemical weapon available.

At 1500 hours the helicopters landed and the company disembarked. Once on the ground, the 1st Section took up positions and supported the 2nd Section, which advanced rapidly toward the command post, seizing in succession the headquarters and the premises of the transportation platoon.

The mortar group, waiting 8 km northeast of the city, received the coordinates enabling it to produce a smokescreen. The 3rd Section was thus able to approach the building that customarily houses the three companies. With the help of grappling hooks, the group penetrated the building and seized it without meeting too much opposition, for the attack was rapid.

The 2nd Section was now positioned facing the parade ground. The 1st Section caught up with "la Génoise" and lent its support with its crack sharpshooters and its LRAC's [antitank rocket launchers]. The mortars were used once more and, in a smokescreen, the first stairway was stormed and every room reconnoitered, and soon one section took up its position while the other two mopped up the officers' building. Each group was in control of its floor.

At 1615 hours the 7th Company held the Montlaur citadel.

Antiaircraft Practice

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Apr 82 p 28

[Text] There is nothing similar between scouting and antiaircraft combat unless it is the watch and identification.

Yet, the SER [?Scouting and Reconnaissance Section] of the 2nd REI [Foreign Infantry Regiment] was entrusted, the day following the Farfadet exercise, with switching to antiaircraft combat for the purpose of the Guepard alert. In other words, it had to garage its jeeps, its submachineguns and its LRAC's [antitank rocket launchers] to learn how to use the 20-millimeter gun.

The "stripping" was done once the group was back from Canjuers, the essential thing being to go over this cannon, dismantle it, strip it and finally know it.

However, a lot remained to be done and it is only after our return from the snows of Suippes that we came to grips with serious matters. But our time was well spent and the drill was effective.

Control of the instruction was achieved thanks to the challenges of the weapons, which made it possible for the servicemen's resolve to move faster and better than their neighbors to be externalized.

The operational tryouts occurred on the occasion of the target practice of 15 February 1982. That morning, the gunners of the 405th Artillery Regiment were surprised to discover 13 holes in the air pipe. It seems that this is rare with 700 shells.

In the final analysis, the antiair self-defense section [SADAA] of the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment acquired a technical competence that it only asks to put into practice overseas.

Activities in Mayotte

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Apr 82 p 27

[Text] The 7th Company of the 2nd REI [Foreign Infantry Regiment] is in Mayotte for a month's tour of duty. Here is a week's schedule, among 23 others, of the 3rd Section.

Monday: Construction of an infantry walkway over a 20-meter trench using natural materials exclusively.

Tuesday: Construction of a bungalow by a combat group. This shelter, anticipated for the extended accommodation of 10 men, was to be built with natural materials like a Comorian hut.

Wednesday: Building of a bamboo raft. Designed for a combat group, it was to make it possible to cross a 1-km water trench safely. Following the crossing, a "burrowing" operation was carried out in the face of an enemy equipped with armored and motorized vehicles.

Thursday: After a landing effected with the French Navy's help, the section staged an attack against the beacons of Bandrele.

2662
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FOREIGN LEGION DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM INITIATED

Paris KEPI BLANC in French May 82 p 12

[Text] On 1 April 1982 the Data Processing Service of the Foreign Legion (STILE) was inaugurated. In the absence of General Lardry, commander of the GLE [Foreign Legion Grouping] and of the 31st Brigade, Colonel Forcin, second in command, pushed a button that should enable the various units of the Foreign Legion stationed in metropolitan France to have access, from their console, to information from the data bank set up in the Vienot district in Aubagne.

This symbolic gesture is the result of several years of work by the data processing team of the Bureau of Personnel.

Indeed, beginning on 14 December 1973, EMAT [Army General Staff] gave its approval for the GLE to be entrusted with data processing work pertaining to the management of its personnel. The Foreign Legion, at first hooked up to the Regional Data Processing Center in Marseilles, was subsequently equipped with a Solar 16-65 computer, which made it autonomous. Simultaneously, the army engineers erected the data processing building while men of the Bureau of Personnel worked to spell out all the needs and to develop a "Socrate"-type data base.

The new data processing system of the Foreign Legion, completely unknown in the regular army, makes data processing capability available at the level of the Foreign Legion units stationed in metropolitan France. It provides better management of personnel by the tapping of information at its source, a daily update of the data base and an opportunity to request output from the computer at the GLE command and troop unit levels.

We now hope that the development of satellite transmission will enable the GLE to acquire an analogous data processing system to cover its units stationed overseas.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

THIRD FOREIGN LEGION INFANTRY REGIMENT IN GUYANA

Field Exercise

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jul 82 p 45

[Text] Every month, in half units, the CCS [specialized control center] of the 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment [RNI] gathers and goes to live for 36 hours in the field.

After a march that leads it through marshes, forests or other obstacles, the bivouac is set up in Baloupi, in a newly laid-out area.

Darkness brings the opportunity to improve night firing instruction and next morning the weapons speak out again, each soldier increasing his attention two-fold as the challenges draw closer. There is always a first bull's eye.

Before returning to Kourou, the mortars and 12.7-millimeter machineguns reform in battery order while work is undertaken to improve the bivouac.

Exercise in Martinique

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jul 82 p 46

[Text] From 6 to 22 March 1982 the 2nd Combat Company of the 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment went to Martinique to face the obstacles of the Nautical and Scaling Center of the "Francois," part of the 33rd RIMa [Marine Infantry Regiment].

This 15-day training session is divided into three parts. The first takes place in Fort-de-France and is devoted essentially to scaling, fall-ins and obstacle courses with arms. The second stage takes place at the "Francois," the regiment's nautical center located on the island's east coast. There, for a little under a week, the trainees virtually do not emerge from the water, the supreme test being the nautical surface crossing, a kind of soldier's race on the surface of the water that, run four times a day not counting those at night, is particularly appreciated by the students. The rest of the schedule is divided between navigational instruction using "Yole" and "Zodiac" craft and swimming in the high seas. The third part consists of a 36-hour group rally in which all the subjects covered are put to use.

Back at the Desaix district there is a short ceremony, presided over by the chief of the 33rd RIMa, when the results of the exercises are read out. The group that ranks first is awarded a small commemorative plaque.

This program was very profitable, notably at the level of the groups and their chiefs, who found themselves alone for 15 days while solving the various problems handed to them. Also, the fact that there is a ranking at the close of the training created an example that incidentally enabled the three groups to significantly improve results in the various contests: Obstacle courses, nautical surface crossings and other crossings.

Once again, the 2nd Combat Company, and by extension the Foreign Legion, have shown themselves worthy of what is expected of them.

Maintenance Section

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 42

[Text] Installed at the Jeanpierre camp, the section is charged with supporting and repairing the equipment, vehicles and engines of the company (2A and 2B, 3rd echelon, often 4th and 5th echelons, as regards the civilian equipment entrusted to the company).

The workshop has its own store of spare parts supplied thanks to a weekly shuttle service with Cayenne (160 km of trails round trip), whose truck does not always come back fully loaded, since equipment is scarce.

The unit's activities are numerous and diversified, namely:

1. Visits to the workshops;
2. Unloading of the LCMs [landing craft] that supply the company. Begun late in the afternoon, each unloading must be completed before nightfall;
3. Operations in the workyard;
4. Operations calling for power to release equipment that is sunk or mixed in the terrain.

Since the personnel in the unit are sufficient, each member works hard because, as the workshop's chief likes to say, "it has to run."

River Exercise

Paris KEPI BLANC in French Jun 82 p 44

[Text] The 2nd Company of the 3rd REI [Foreign Infantry Regiment], away on a deep probe, had left its five pirogues at the Claude pier, pursuing its route by the Encrillons road.

A small unit of the CCS [specialized control center] took advantage of this to get away from Kourou and effect a particularly interesting river exercise on the tributaries of the Oyapock before returning to Saint Georges by way of this border river.

On 12 February 1982 a half unit sailed in a "Puma" craft to join the five pirogues no less than 225 km away, south southwest of Kourou.

On 13 February the unit chief arrived, accompanied by the military commander in French Guiana.

On 14 February the men left on their river adventure. The water level was low and it was necessary to push the craft right from the first few meters. The initial wading in the water early in the morning seemed unpleasant to many of the men, but very soon they became used to the idea of being wet all the time. As for those manning the pirogues, they proved to be remarkable and showed real prowess in sailing down the short river, the Tamouri, using poles exclusively for propulsion, doing that for 2 days under a driving rain. Their only fear was fireflies.

On 16 February the engines were tried. In short order the first waterfalls turned up: "Get off and push!" was the order given, one that was learned fast and repeated often. At night the men appreciated their bivouacs. There was a hot meal and a small dry corner.

On 18 February, after a few problems with the engines, which obliged us to stop at Camopi, we came on a sizable obstacle: The Maripa waterfall. Fortunately, everything was solved with ease and soon after Saint Georges came into view.

The next day at noon, our "Puma" craft fished us out from under veritable water-spouts, which no longer bothered us.

2662
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MILITARY

FRANCE

SPOT, SAMRO SATELLITE QUALITIES FOR MILITARY USE OF SPACE

Paris DEFENSE in French No 24, Mar 82 pp 39-42

[Article by Col Robert Genty: "Space and Its Military Aspect"]

[Text] Col Robert Genty* (ninth session) has kindly authorized us to publish this summary of the talk he delivered before our association on 17 February 1982 and we hereby express our thanks to him.

We publish this text with the agreement of the magazine STRATEGIQUE, which is also publishing in its issue No 13 of March 1982, and in greater detail, the ideas expounded by Colonel Genty.

Space Equilibrium

Without crossing over into the realm of speculative considerations that touch on the infinite universe, we shall limit our view of military space to the terrestrial environment within the solar system. This system is also viewed as a cohesive whole in harmonious equilibrium made up of movements and rotations arising from the relationships inherent in Newton's well-known law.

Applied to Earth, this law accounts for the fall of objects having mass in the direction of the center of our planet and in accordance with a force called gravity, which must be opposed to preserve the equilibrium of every object and of every person, including the astronaut. This new individual, in fact, cannot maintain an attitude unless there is imparted to him a sufficient speed of rotation around the earth to generate a centrifugal force that opposes gravity. This is what is known as gravitation.

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It follows that any body placed under those conditions will act like the moon with respect to the earth and constitute a true artificial satellite.

The equilibrium of the system thus defined is totally gratuitous but on the other hand imposes a total rigidity of the plane of movement, which--under these conditions--maintains a fixed orientation in space.

Passive Satellites

From the start of the space era, the military as well as the civilian sector have looked to the use of space to satisfy certain of their needs, very similar though they are, namely, telecommunications, meteorology, reconnaissance, geodesy and navigation, among others.

The means for accomplishing these ends, which we designate "passive satellites," have also been of the same type in both cases.

In telecommunications, both military and civilian projects adopted straight-away the geostationary satellite. This type of vehicle gravitates about the center of the earth in the latter's equatorial plane at a speed such that it remains permanently above the same point on the equator. Its position is therefore fixed with respect to the earth as a whole. Under these conditions, its altitude is around 36,000 km, enabling it to cover radioelectrically a spherical dome--at the surface of the globe--whose extreme latitudes, practically speaking are ± 78 degrees. With three geostationary satellites spaced 120 degrees from one another, coverage can be conveniently limited to a terrestrial spherical segment of ± 60 degrees of latitude.

But it appears that the use of geostationary satellites is now being extended to other purposes in addition to telecommunications, namely, meterology, for example. In June 1981, Ariane put into orbit, at 0 degrees longitude, the geostationary meteorological satellite Meteosat 2, successor to Meteosat 1, which was put into geostationary orbit in 1977 and failed operationally many months ago.

Meteorological satellites, in fact, are for the most part of another kind. They are in the category of so-called heliosynchronous satellites, the essential characteristic of which is that their orbital plane and the direction of the sun form a constant angle.

Under these conditions, if this angle is zero, the direction of the mean sun will be permanently contained within the satellite's orbital plane and the satellite will cross the equator from south to north at local true noon. This configuration yields optimal sunlighting of the earth during the satellite's corresponding half-revolution, hence maximal visible-spectrum output from its imaging equipment. During the other half-revolution, effected at night, the infrared spectrum enjoys the same advantage. Such a vehicle is called a "noonlight satellite." Its use is limited to meteorology.

Heliosynchronous space vehicles are very well suited to the reconnaissance of earthbound events. In 1984, France is to launch an observation satellite --the SPOT [Earth Observation Probe System]--whose terrestrial resolving power will be of the order of some 10 meters. A few years later, the French military in turn will have SAMRO's [Military Optical Reconnaissance Satellite(s)] with the same properties.

Modern geodesy--an important factor in the art of war--owes much to artificial satellites that are enabling geodesists to penetrate the oceans and the deserts. These, too, are generally of the heliosynchronous type.

Navigational purposes, however, call for the use of a heliosynchronous satellite of a particular kind, since it is desirable that maritime and aerial navigators know that in such and such a region of the globe they can count on the passage of a satellite in accordance with a given schedule. We will call this a timetable satellite, since this vehicle is capable of passing every day at the same time over the same terrestrial point, without remaining there, of course. For this to be the case, the heliosynchronous satellite need only complete a whole number of revolutions in 24 hours.

It is worth pointing out that timetable satellites can be used advantageously for telecommunications purposes, especially in the military sphere since, by design they cover well-defined zones of the planet's surface.

Active Satellites

True, in 1967, an accord was signed by the UN powers establishing, after a fashion, the neutrality of space. The limitations it placed on space vehicles, however, are not as restrictive as one might think. These are limited, in effect, to a prohibition against carrying nuclear weapons or large quantities of explosives that could be used for massive destruction. Be that as it may, an awareness of the degree of risk orbital bombs--as they are frequently called--could pose, were they to be used as real weapons, is not unwarranted.

To this end, we shall analyze the problem by assessing the value of space resources from the standpoint of military criteria, among which we will select the principal ones, bearing in mind that, for a long time to come yet, military targets will remain terrestrial and that therefore we need only consider relatively modest altitudes.

Surprise (Napoleon's 35th Maxim)

Speed: Surprise is a direct function of the speed of movement of an attack. At medium altitudes, this speed is on the order of 7,000 meters per second [m/sec], hence definitely higher than that of missiles ($3,000\text{ m/sec}$), of shells ($1,000\text{--}1,500\text{ m/sec}$) and of airborne bombs (a few hundred m/sec).

We will therefore dwell no further on this aspect of the question.

Secretness: The question is whether an artificial satellite is a concealable object. Certainly, at altitudes below 1,000 km, a space vehicle is easily locatable. Entirely to the contrary, however, at altitudes above 2,000 km it is very difficult to detect. The fact is that whereas radar detection of a naval or airborne formation is of the linear type, space detection is of the volumetric type, in that the attacking missile can plunge down on its target from any point in the sky whatever. The difficulty of detection is thus cubed in magnitude.

Moreover, given the vehicle's enormous velocity, it must be detected at very long distances for sufficient warning. Now the experts know that the installed electrical power required to do this is proportional to the fourth mathematical power of that distance.

Thus, electromagnetic detection--while not impossible--presents real difficulties from the practical standpoint and is necessarily very costly.

Concentration of Fire (Napoleon's 12th Maxim)

Momentum: In his sixth maxim [maximum numbers as published], the emperor stressed the value--in the art of war--of the concept of momentum (the product of the mass of a body and its speed), well known in theoretical mechanics, and the need to maximize it.

As far as speed is concerned, we have seen that this factor is in this case optimal. What then about mass?

From the standpoint of gravitational mass [weight], the tonnages carried up can only be relatively small: A few tons at the very most. But in the case under consideration, it is the explosive mass that must be considered, meaning the nuclear payload, which as is known constitutes a maximum.

The criterion of momentum of the orbital bomb appears, under these conditions, to be fully met.

Precision: The concentration of fire is also a function of the precision of impact, which involves two essential elements:

a. Orbital precision: Calculation of the position of a gravitating vehicle with respect to its trajectory requires the factoring in of speed and time. The precision with which this position can be pinpointed will therefore be a function of the precision with which these two factors can be determined:

--Speed: A mathematical study of the problem shows that the margin of error in the measurement of the speed is the same as that of the acceleration, a parameter than can be directly measured.

The know-how now exists--especially in France--to build equipment, known as accelerometers, capable of yielding gravitational measurements of 10^{-10}m/sec^2 , that is one-tenth of a billionth of a meter per second. Measurements of 10^{-6}m/sec^2 are readily obtainable as run-of-the-mill, which for the speeds under consideration correspond to a precision on the order of 1 cm/sec; this is more than ample for speeds of around 7,000 m/sec.

--Time: Under laboratory conditions, time can be measured within better than 10^{-9} sec, that is, one-billionth of a second. But in practice, a precision of 10^{-6} sec is easily obtainable, which when coupled with the preceding one, yields a positioning accuracy of around 1 cm.

b. Accuracy of impact:

--Atmosphere: The possible error involved depends of course on the potential deviations owing to the passage through the atmosphere penetrated in the downward direction of the vehicle. It is hardly possible to escape this error.

It is to be noted, however, that the passage can be substantially shortened by using steeper and steeper reentry trajectories. The situation moreover, is substantially better than in the case of the airborne bomb, whose semiparabolic trajectory is entirely within the dense atmosphere, or that of the shell, which is faster but has a much longer range to cover, the latter furthermore having to be covered in the lower atmosphere, or of the missile, which traverses this atmosphere twice, once on the rise and once on the descent.

--Geodesy: Last, to avoid too great an alteration in orbital precision, it is absolutely imperative that the target be pinpointed with the same accuracy as the satellite bomb, conforming, as it were, to the terms of Napoleon's 31st maxim.

It must be borne in mind, however, that maneuverability of the vehicle as regards altitude and direction, to correct for or rectify all deviations arising from natural constraints, can be a determining factor in the concentration of fire.

Mobility

Mobility increases the availability of a weapon, any delay in the use of which, little though it may be, would rapidly prove excessive and nullifying. It also facilitates evasion on the defensive and increases yeild on the offensive.

But how is it obtainable unless through maneuverability.

Maneuverability

Let us consider now in more detail the maneuverability aspect of space vehicles.

First of all, let us consider a change in altitude. Let us assume that the injection of an artificial satellite into orbit has required a given amount of energy and that we impart to this vehicle in orbit the same amount of energy.

The result, unexpected though it may be, is nonetheless significant, since the vehicle we are considering must reach the moon.

On the contrary, a change in direction poses other problems.

If in the foregoing example we were to use the mentioned additional energy instead to obtain a change in the direction of the vehicle, the latter would deviate by 60 degrees while at the same time undergoing an acceleration 700 times that of gravity, which would be prohibitive, for its equipment as well as for a crew.

This phenomenon should not surprise us. We said at the beginning of this discussion that the plane of the trajectory is fixed as to its orientation in space by virtue of the laws of nature. It is therefore practically impossible to change direction, that is, to make a turn in space. Any reorientation of a manned vehicle must be limited to a very few degrees, owing to the expenditure of energy required, which is always very high, and the enormous accelerations generated.

Under these conditions, it is valid to say that there can be no question whatever at this time of designing manned space vehicles having a maneuverability similar to that of a fighter plane.

Comments

Defensive

From what has been said above, and despite the constraints that characterize its use, it can reasonably be deduced that the use of the orbital bomb as a defensive instrument could prove very effective.

It is in fact not necessary to subject it to directional changes to accomplish its mission against offensive satellites. The maneuvers to be effected involve only changes in altitude, which in fact are easy to execute, as we have seen.

Furthermore, to reduce delays in the use of an orbital bomb that has been detected, is it not possible to use a form of action that has been abandoned in the aviation sector as being too costly in energy and very hard on aircraft crews, namely, airborne warning?

Considering the gratuitous nature of space flight, it is possible to conceive of norias of gravitating orbital bombs, ready to use for the destruction of attacking satellites.

Offensive

Because of the practical impossibility of directional maneuver, it becomes necessary to resort to special automated types of satellites. In this case, the timetable satellite can threaten a given point of the earth, duly chosen and pinpointed. The interventional delay, which is 24 hours for a single satellite in orbit, becomes a function of the number of satellites in orbit.

But the regions immediately adjacent to the poles are not covered by timetable satellites for reasons of space mechanics. They must be covered, therefore, by polar satellites, which pass exactly vertically over both poles and can be made to operate as timetable satellites in the same manner as heliosynchronous satellites.

Last, it is not inconceivable to create a type of nongeostationary equatorial satellite--at altitudes below 36,000 km--capable of operating in the same manner and threatening equatorial points on a regularly recurrent timetable.

Under these conditions, and recognizing that the development of a global weapons system of the manned combat fleet or armada type is, as of now, out of the question, it would be nonetheless unwise to minimize the importance of the orbital bomb.

Conclusion

Putting aside without further discussion a singular aspect of the question involved our natural satellite, the moon, which could indeed be used to launch rockets, and even artillery shells, toward Earth, the conclusion can hardly be avoided that a normal military use of space--the new domain that has been opened to the activities of man--is unquestionably dependent on directional maneuver.

We have seen that it is hardly reasonable to expect to fulfill this condition on an operational basis in the present circumstances, except in certain very specific cases.

But should the space turn one day become possible, which is theoretically not unrealizable within the present purview of space mechanics, the foregoing reservations will fall of their own weight and the orbital bomb will on this basis become extremely formidable, warranting then--and without the least doubt--the dreadful name of absolute weapon.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

HERNU ON ANG AIRCRAFT--Accompanied by CA [Rear Admiral] Hugues and several members of his civilian and military office, Mr Charles Hernu, also followed by a dozen journalists, was received at Lann-Bihoue on 11 June by Admiral Lannuzel, VAE [Wing Vice Admiral] Brac de la Perriere, VA [Vice Admiral] Herbaut, and CA Ghesquiere for a visit to the program, including the award of decorations, presentation of the maritime patrol aircraft, flight in the Breguet Atlantic, demonstration of the Marine Commando Group, and fine weather. Mr Hernu made some important statements. First of all he made a statement pertaining to the decision which had just been made to start the industrial production and series production phases of the Atlantic G2 program (abbreviated ATL2), until now called Atlantic Nouvelle Generation (ANG). These 42 aircraft, the first of which will be operational in 1987, will get the benefit of all the lessons learned on the Atlantic and will use an entirely new weapons systems produced by French industry and relying heavily on data processing. The performances of the radar detection ASM equipment and the infrared identification device for anti-ship warfare as well as their torpedo and AM-30 missile carrying capacity will make these aircraft redoubtable fighting machines. In peace time, for public service missions, they will continue the task of the current atlantic aircraft whose effectiveness need no longer be proved. Then Mr Hernu, during the same speech, announced that the "Montcalm," the "Meuse," and the "Argens" had just left Toulon for the coast of Lebanon, thus demonstrating the role which the French Navy has to play in times of crisis and underscoring the government's determination to protect French nationals overseas. [Excerpt] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 26 Jun 82 p 18-19] 5058

AVISO TO INDIAN OCEAN IN JULY--The dual-purpose frigate "Protet" left Lorient on Saturday, 15 May, to sail to Toulon. It arrived on 21 July 1981, commanded by Commander Collin to spend the 8 months necessary for its maintenance with us. On 5 March, Commander de Maintenant took command of the vessel. The eighth in a series of nine, the "Protet" was outfitted for trials in 1963. It was named for RAdm August Leopold Protet, born in Saint-Servan on 20 April 1808, killed in action on 15 May 1862 during the attack of Nekiao in China. Early in July it will sail to the maritime zone of the Indian Ocean with its nine officers, 61 petty officers, and 96 seamen 1st class and able-bodied seamen. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 26 Jun 82 p 19] 5058

'INFLEXIBLE' LAUNCHED 23 JUNE--Laid down in March 1980--the decision to build had been made in 1978--the "Inflexible" was launched on Wednesday, 23 June, at 1030, by the DCAN [Naval Construction and Naval Weapons Directorate] of Cherbourg in the presence of Mr Pierre Mauroy, the prime minister, and Mr Charles Hernu, the defense minister. A large crowd witnessed the launching of the Navy's sixth strategic submarine; the "Inflexible" is the fifth vessel by that name--the fourth one was a 40-gun vessel outfitted in 1840--and has the main features of the submarines of the "Le Redoutable" type but it has weapons of a new generation, including the M-4 missile with multiple nuclear warheads and greater range. It will also be equipped with a new multipurpose sonar and it will benefit from the progress made in the field of navigation and communications. Commander Metayer is responsible for its outfitting and attended the ceremony. The first captain of the "Inflexible" early commanded the "Flore" and the "Morse." With a degree in atomic engineering, he had been put in charge of the Operations Group during the outfitting of the "Indomptable" with which he went on four patrols. Since 1979 he had been assigned to the staff of the Strategic Ocean Force. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 26 Jun 82 p 21] 5058

NEW COMMANDER FOR 'FOCH'--VAE [Squadron Vice Admiral] Lacoste, commanding the Mediterranean squadron, met the new captain of the aircraft carrier "Foch," Captain Debray, who succeeds Captain Coatanea, at Piraeus. As part of the spring maneuvers, the "Foch" had dropped anchor in the roads of Piraeus. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 12 Jun 82 p 20] 5058

TWO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS ON 'FOCH'--Two aircraft accidents marked the return of the aircraft carrier "Foch" to Toulon. The vessel had come back from Greece where it participated in the "Phidias" exercise. At the moment it was catapulted, a Brequet Alize fell into the ocean. The crew was rescued quickly. CPO Henry, the pilot, PO Jung, the navigator, and PO Cosson, the radar operator, were unharmed. A second aircraft, a Super Etandard, piloted by Lt (s.g.) Saldes, participated in a training mission when it hit the water. The funeral services for Lt (s.g.) Saldes were held at the BAN [Naval Air Base] of Hyeres. In front of the men, drawn up in formation, VAE Orosco awarded the pilot the Knight's Cross of the Legion of Honor, posthumously, with the following citation: "As a naval officer, in charge of a shipboard aircraft assault patrol, exemplary in his duty performance and his enthusiasm for flying, he set an example of professional competence and obtained obedience based on friendship from his subordinates." [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 19 Jun 82 p 18] 5058

A69 AVISO LAUNCHED--The sun smiled on the birth of the 14th A69 frigate built at Lorient by DCAN [Naval Construction and Naval Weapons Directorate]. The "Enseigne de vaisseau Jacoubet" was reviewed under a cloudless sky on 15 May; the vessel is named for a hero of World War II. [Excerpt] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 12 Jun 82 p 21] 5058

'RACOON' EXERCISE IN GUADELOUPE--To begin its 8th year, the "Francis Garnier" was given the benefit of a period of 2 months of IPER [expansion unknown] at Fort-de-France. Everybody on board could only pay tribute to the effectiveness and devotion to duty on the part of the personnel of the BSL [Fleet Support Ship, Submarine Tender] "Garonne" in its ship support mission. To mark this fruitful cooperation, a cocktail party was given on the flight deck of the "Francis Garnier." The vessel rapidly returned to duty, actively participating in the Racoon maneuver. During this exercise, it deployed on Guadeloupe the entire 33rd RIMA [Marine Infantry Regiment], the company of mobilized reservists included, totaling more than 500 military personnel and 60 vehicles. All of this was accomplished without any major incident and that proves the quality of work done by the technicians of the "Garonne." [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 5 Jun 82 p 22] 5058

RUBIS' LEAVES FOR SEA TRIALS--Marking the end of 7 years of work for the arsenal, the prototype of the nuclear attack submarines, the "Rubis" left Cherbourg for a last series of trials to be accomplished in the Gulf of Gascogne before the long crossing which will precede its commissioning for active service in the Mediterranean. After 4-½ months of trials in 1981, the submarine returned to the Cherbourg arsenal for the traditional period of dismantling. It is practically operational but the last adjustments will be made in the course of the next several weeks. The world's smallest nuclear combat submarine was inspected by VA [Vice Admiral] Crouzat, the maritime prefect prior to its departure from Cherbourg, where the local press was received for the first time on board by CF [Commander] Foillard, assisted by ICA [Engr-RAdm] Le Miere. The impression of the visitors was very favorable: "The colors adopted for the compartments reserved for the food services are fresh and cheerful, something which is unusual in a submarine. This is a 'submarine in a spring outfit' which we discovered on board this prototype with the name of a precious stone," according to our sister publication, LA PRESSE DE LA MANCHE. [Text] [Paris COLS BLEUS in French 29 May 82 p 20] 5058

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DATE FILMED

Sept. 1, 1982